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To what extent have macro and structural reforms in many developing countries 
affected the labor market? Are current policy settings in the labor market adequate to cope 
with the current challenges of a more dynamic but also more risky economic environment? 
Are there examples of successful labor reforms that have combined greater adaptability with 
greater workers’ protection? What can labor policy do when resources are scarce and 
informality looms large? These are some of the questions we address in this paper by 
presenting an in-depth review of formal policy and institutional settings in the labor market 
of many developing and emerging economies. We also report some evidence of the effects of 
policy reforms on job creation and on the ability of workers to cope with shocks.     
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Introduction 
  Our investigation on the role of labor market policies and institutions in developing 
countries starts with a simple consideration: Labor is the main asset of people, especially the 
poor, and it is an essential factor of production for firms of all types and sizes.  The World 
Bank survey “Voices of the Poor” (Narayan et al. 2002) found that for more than 70 percent 
of the poor finding a job, whether salaried or self-employed, is the main way out of poverty.  
And in most developing and emerging economies about 90 percent of jobs are created by 
private firms.  At the same time, even in high-tech manufacturing plants, labor plays a key 
role, and any innovation in the organization of production or in the quality and variety of 
products requires new skills and competencies.  In this context, the way in which employers’ 
demand for labor and households’ supply of it interact is crucial in determining the 
conditions in which firms find the proper incentives for engaging in growth enhancing 
activities and workers fully participate in, and benefit from, these activities. 
 The interactions between labor demand and supply have been profoundly affected 
by global developments in the past decades. The transition of many developing countries and 
former centrally planned economies to market-based development, the greater integration of 
economies, with major improvements in the way goods and services flow across them, have 
changed the rules of the game within which businesses, the state and labor interplay. The 
opening of markets has exposed previously protected firms to greater competition. The scale 
of production has often changed, from large oligopolies protected by trade barriers, to 
smaller production units.  Firms have gained access to new technologies and are facing 




 Shifting to a market-based and more open economy has created new economic 
opportunities, but also exposed firms and workers to new risks.  Greater integration in world 
markets have enhanced opportunities for entrepreneurs to launch new activities and for 
existing firms to expand, both contributing to a faster job creation in expanding sectors.  But 
technological changes and expanding international interactions have also threatened firms 
and jobs in declining industries.  More generally, pressure has increased to make work 
arrangements more flexible to enable firms to adapt to changing economic conditions. While 
some countries have explicitly moved in that direction, others have resisted this pressure for 
greater labor market adaptability and, in some cases, have even reinforced mandated 
protection.  In many countries where reforms have lagged, greater labor market adaptability 
has been channeled through a growing informal sector and downward flexibility in real 
wages.  Since labor market policy and social security systems are often under-developed, 
many workers have increasingly be exposed the volatility of a more competitive, open but 
also more risky economic environment.   
 To what extent have macro and structural reforms in many developing countries 
affected the labor market? Are current policy settings in the labor market adequate to cope 
with the current challenges of a more dynamic but also more risky economic environment? 
Are there examples of successful labor reforms that have combined greater adaptability with 
greater workers’ protection? What can labor policy do when resources are scarce and 
informality looms large? These are some of the questions we try to address in this paper.  
  The structure of the paper is as follows.  In Section 1, we review the evidence on the 
flexibility of the labor market in developing and emerging economies, and discuss how 
macro and structural changes have affected workers.  In Section 2 we maps government laws 
and regulations in the labor market and assess their potential effects on workers as well as on 
firms’ decision to invest and create jobs.  Finally, in Section 3 we discuss the role of public 
policies in promoting the mobility of workers towards more productive jobs while also 




1.  Interactions between the investment climate and the labor market 
  Efficient utilization of labor is essential for sustainable long-term economic growth 
and for poverty reduction.  This entails high levels of employment, enhancement of human 
capital, and labor mobility.  A simple decomposition of the sources of economic growth over 
the past decades suggests that the combined effect of greater utilization of labor and 
enhancement in human capital have generally made a significant contribution to 
improvements in output per capita.  More interestingly, many countries that have seen 
improvements in their growth performance over the past decade have also seen improvement 
in the quality of the workforce and in some cases an increase in the employment rate (the 
share of the total working age population involved in productive activities) (Figure 1a).  Even 
more importantly, household living standards, especially amongst the poor, are closely tied to 
their income from work, and a labor market that leads to high labor utilization, especially in 
formal activities, is a key vehicle to reduce poverty and exclusion (Figure 1b).     
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 While some countries – especially in East and South Asia – have been able to 
combine strong economic growth with an often rising labor utilization and enhancement of 
human capital, many others in the developing world have seen weak or even deteriorating 
labor market conditions.  Often this is because private job creation has not kept pace with the 
increase in the working age population and/or the increase in female participation in the labor 
market.  The most striking examples are in Sub-Saharan Africa, where despite some 
improvement in human capital, job creation in the formal sector has been largely outpaced by 
the increase in the working age population, leading to a further spread of informal 
employment.
1   Even stronger increases in population in the Middle East and North Africa 
have been coupled with greater participation of women in the labor market – from low levels 
– creating mounting pressure on the labor market.
2    
  Moreover, falling employment and high unemployment have been a feature of many 
transition economies.  While unemployment rates were practically nil at the beginning of the 
1990s in most of them, they jumped to two-digit levels in the early phases of the transition to 
                                                 
1 See ILO (2002) for a review of the development of the informal economy over the past decade. 
2 According to a recent World Bank Study (2003a), between 1950 and 1990, 47 million workers were added to 
the labor force in the North Africa and Middle East region, but in the 1990s the labor force increased by some 




a market economy. Despite strong economic growth in some countries in more recent years, 
they are still often above 10 per cent (or even close to 20 per cent in Poland, Slovak 
Republic, and former Yugoslavia) and labor force participation rates have declined steadily.  
Many Latin American countries, including those with sustained growth, have also seen major 
rises in unemployment and inequality together with falls in participation rates: for example, 
the unemployment rate doubled to more than 10% in Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the 
1990s and the share of working poor in total employment rose together with wage and 
income inequality in most countries. At the same time, while measured unemployment has 
remained relatively low in South Asia, the share of working poor has reached almost 40% on 
average in the region.  
  These unsatisfactory outcomes in the labor market are a source of major concern for 
workers and employers alike.  Surveys of entrepreneurs in more than 80 countries  have 
consistently shown that labor market restrictions are amongst the main obstacles for the 
operation and growth of businesses in many countries (Table 1).
3  At the same time, poor 
labor market conditions, including high and persistent unemployment and lack of 
employment and income stability, are the main concern of many people in developing 
countries, especially amongst the poor.
4  How much of these unfavorable outcomes for both 
employers and workers are due to poorly functioning labor markets, and how much is 
reflected in them, because of failures of other markets to promote growth?   
  
                                                 
3 These surveys ask managers of firms to rank eight areas – business licensing, customs and foreign trade 
restrictions, foreign currency and exchange regulations, labor regulations, environmental regulations, fire and 
safety regulations, tax regulations and their administration, and high effective tax rates – in terms of how 
problematic regulations are for the operation and growth of their companies. Labor regulations were perceived 
to be the major obstacle to business activity in Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Namibia, Panama, 
South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, and Venezuela. Portugal was the only OECD country where labor regulations 
are perceived as the major obstacle to doing business. Labor regulations were rated the second most important 
obstacle in Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Ecuador, Estonia, Mexico, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uruguay, and 
Zimbabwe, but also in Italy and Singapore. Business Environment Surveys were conducted in more than 80 
countries by the World Bank over the 1999-2000 period.  
4 A recent participatory study conducted in 23 countries, gathered the opinions of poor people, most of whom 
pointed to increased unemployment and decline in the availability of “regular” or “normal” work as the main 





Table 1: Employers rank labor market regulations as a significant constraint to their 
business in most developing regions. 
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Note: WBES: World Business Environment Survey; ICS: Investment Climate Surveys. 
 
On the one hand, high and persistent unemployment, a large informal sector or low 
participation may all reflect the inability of labor market to facilitate labor mobility and 
promote firms’ investment, because of restrictions in wage or labor adjustments or low 
incentives for investment in human capital.  On the other hand, the labor market may simply 
reflect problems in other markets which, by curbing firms’ developments also limit the 
process of job creation and wage improvements.  Some deterioration in labor market 
conditions may also be a temporary side effect of structural reforms aimed at improving the 
investment climate.  For example, macro-economic reforms, trade liberalization or large 
scale privatization all require large reallocation of workers and changes in skills.  Even in the 
best of all possible labor markets, such changes may lead to temporary increases in 
unemployment and loss of income, as workers need to change job, acquire new skills and 




forces in the labor and other markets that bring demand for workers in line with supply.  In 
practice, it is difficult to disentangle these different elements as labor markets interact closely 
with other markets and reforms impose pressure on all of them also affecting these 
interactions.  Bearing these caveats in mind, the remainder of this section will shed some 
light on these linkages in turn.   
How adaptable are labor markets in developing countries? 
  Different factors contribute to the adaptability of the labor market and thus its ability 
to promote investment, job creation and growth.  First, firms should be allowed to adjust 
wages and employment to changing demand conditions and to adopt new technologies.  At 
the same time, market economies require a continuous reallocation of labor away from 
declining firms and industries toward expanding ones, and labor markets have a key role to 
facilitate this process and thus contribute to productivity gains and better prospects for 
workers.  Developing and transition countries differ with respect to actual labor market 
adaptability, although lack of relevant information makes it difficult to depict a 
comprehensive picture.   
  Evidence suggests a significant – and often growing – response of wages to changes 
in labor market conditions in some countries.  At the same time, in many countries a 
substantial number of jobs are created and destroyed every year pointing to a continuous 
process of labor reallocation.  Both factors should be qualified: high downward wage 
flexibility may be related to unanticipated high (or hyper) inflation which expose workers to 
major income losses; and labor mobility may not contribute to growth and better conditions 
for workers if it involves large flows towards the informal economy.  
Real wage flexibility 
 In many industrial countries, the elasticity of wages to local (or regional) 
unemployment is estimated to be around -0.10, i.e. an increase in unemployment from 5 to 6 
per cent leads to a fall in real wages by 2 per cent.  This elasticity varies widely across 
developing countries.  In some of them, including Côte d’Ivoire and South Korea the 
responsiveness of wages to unemployment is weaker than that observed for industrial 




economic and wage growth have attracted many rural workers, some of whom have not 
found a job and have instead joined the unemployment pool.  By contrast, the reactivity of 
wages to unemployment in other countries – including several transition economies – is 
similar to that found in industrial countries, and even higher as in Brazil (Table 2).   
Table 2: Wages react to labor market conditions 






Côte d’Ivoire  -0.06  
South Africa  -0.12 to -0.08  
  
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East 
Germany, Hungary and Poland 
-0.09 to -0.04 
Turkey  -0.07 to –0.09 
  
South Korea  -0.04 
China  0.08 to 0.09  
  
Australia -0.19 






Norway   -0.08 
Switzerland   -0.12 
United Kingdom  -0.08 
United States   -0.10 
Note: The elasticity is the change in real wage as a result of a doubling in the 
unemployment rate. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, a doubling of the 
unemployment rate leads to a 6 percent decrease in wages. 
Sources: Hoddinott, 1996 ; Sabin, 1999 ; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1995 and 
1998; Kingdon and Knight, 1999; Amadeo and Camargo, 1997; Berg and 
Contreras, 2002; Ilkkaracan and Selim, 2003. 
 
  It is noticeable that structural reforms have changed the responsiveness of wages to 
labor market conditions. For example, in Chile there was no evidence of the wage curve 




the opening of the economy and deregulation (1974-1996), with the regional unemployment 
elasticity of pay equal to –0.08.  Similarly, in Romania, where market reforms have been less 
advanced than in Hungary or Poland, there is no strong relationship between the evolution of 
regional wages and unemployment rates.   
  It should be stressed, however, that the flexibility of real wages in many developing 
countries has often been achieved in the past by the lack of full indexation of nominal wages 
during periods of high (or hyper) inflation in downturns.  In a low inflation environment and 
given the natural tendency for workers to resist nominal wage reductions, the ability of 
wages to accommodate demand fluctuations may be reduced.  For example, wage elasticity 
in Argentina in the 1980s – a period of high inflation – was about 10 times higher than wage 
elasticity in the 1990s – a period of lower inflation – and employment elasticity in the 1990s 
was twice as large as employment elasticity in the 1980s.
5   In any event, wage adjustments 
may not be enough to accommodate changes in labor demand, especially in countries 
undergoing major structural changes, where new firms replace obsolete ones, new sectors 
emerge and new technologies have to be adopted to maintain competitiveness. 
Labor mobility 
 At the aggregate level, most low- and middle-income countries have experienced 
significant shifts in employment, away from low-productive agricultural activities to 
manufacturing and, especially new service activities (Figure 2).  The magnitude of the 
sectoral reallocation is particularly noticeable in the formerly centrally-planned economies, 
where service activities have flourished during the transition, most of the time at the expense 
of obsolete manufacturing firms.  But significant changes in the sectoral allocation of 
employment are also visible in the Middle East and North Africa and Latin America.  This 
secular trend away from agriculture and towards manufacturing and services hides significant 
differences in the ability to match labor demand and supply.   
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Source: WDI (2003). 
 
  In countries for which data are available, gross rates of job creation and destruction 
each range between 5 and 20 percent, adding up to a total job turnover of up to 40 percent 
(Figure 3).  A significant fraction of this job turnover (often 30-50 percent) is due to the entry 
and exit of firms, an important factor for output and productivity growth (Figure 4).
6  This 
sizeable process of creation and destruction of jobs in most countries does not necessarily 
mean that the reallocation of labor is efficient.  The latter depends on whether job flows lead 
to the allocation of workers to most productive use and thus are associated with productivity 
growth and wage increases.   
                                                 
6 It should also be noted that in all countries, worker turnover is even larger than job turnover, because workers 
not only move directly from one job to another, but also between employment and unemployment and inactivity 




Figure 3: Large job turnover in industrial and developing countries in the 1990s 
(Firms with 20 or more employees) 
 
 
Source:  Bartelsman and others (2004). 
 
  Figure 4: Job turnover is high because of the entry and exit of firms 
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 In particular, job destruction may be inefficient if, for example, capital markets 
constrain the ability of firms to cope with negative shocks and retain valuable workers.   
Credit constraints are a severe problem for small firms in many developing countries and it is 
thus not surprising that these firms tend to have higher levels of job reallocation.
7   Moreover, 
certain labor market policies may inflate job flows, without necessarily leading to better 
outcomes.  The Brazilian labor market, for example, looks hyperactive from an international 
perspective, largely because workers induce dismissal to cash in their forced savings (in the 
form of severance payment) which will be otherwise depleted in real terms because of lack of 
indexation. 
  In addition, labor reallocation may go in the wrong direction, especially if dismissed 
workers cannot properly search for jobs because they cannot afford to remain without 
income.  For example, in Latin American countries dismissed workers often go to the 
informal sector because the lack of unemployment benefits prevent them for properly 
searching for another (formal job).
8  And many workers dismissed by obsolete and closing-
down firms in transition economies have returned to subsistence agricultural activities in 
those countries where job creation has been lacking.  In Romania as well as in many Central 
Asian countries the share of total employment in agriculture has increased during the 
transition to reach more than 40-50 per cent of total employment in 2002. 
Internal and international migration 
  The reallocation of labor towards more productive uses often involves large flows of 
workers across regions (rural-rural and rural-urban) and across borders.  Both patterns are 
highly heterogeneous across countries and time and have played different roles in smoothing 
labor market pressures.  Traditional models have emphasized the role of rural-urban 
migration as a key engine of development.
9   These flows are often very large: in a survey of 
29 countries over the 1960s and 1970s, on average 39 per cent of urban population growth 
                                                 
7 See Caballero et al. (2003) for a discussion of the ability of different firms to adapt to negative shocks. 
8 See IADB (2003). 
9 See Todaro (1969); Harris and Todaro (1970). Amongst many others, see de Haan (1999) for review of the 




resulted from net immigration from the rural areas and reclassification of rural in urban 
areas.
10    
  Whether these large domestic flows of workers smooth labor market pressures and 
contribute to a better allocation of resources depends on the characteristics of those who 
migrate and on policies that may influence the decision at the individual or household levels.  
Large flows of often unskilled workers are likely to increase unemployment in receiving 
urban areas if labor demand does not respond quickly.  Immigrants in urban areas may be 
low skilled compared to the urban labor force, but they are generally young with relatively 
better education than the local workforce.  Hence, emigration may reduce the potential for 
rural development if remittances towards rural areas do not compensate for the loss of human 
capital.    
 International migration may also be considered as a factor in promoting efficient 
allocation of resources, but, at the same time, may deprive a country of its main human 
capital assets.  Two to three million people, often relatively highly skilled workers, are 
estimated to emigrate every year.  This brain drain may reduce unemployment pressures in 
the short run in the sending country, but may as well impair its capacity to harness modern 
technologies in the medium to longer term.  Indeed, some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the Caribbean, Central America and South Asia have lost around one-third of their skilled 
workforce because of out-migration.
11    
 However, recent research also points to the benefits of emigration, in particular 
through the potentials offered by remittances and the role that returning emigrants may play 
for local development.  Remittances have become an important aspect of global development 
finance.  From 1995 to 2000, remittances rose from $50 billion to $88 billion.
12    Those 
remittances are used to support family members and can stimulate domestic demand as well 
local investment.  Many relatively high-skilled emigrants also return to the home countries 
and establish their own business.  Several East Asian economies have benefited from the 
return of migrants to the home country.                                      
                                                 
10 See Preston (1979) for a review of 29 developing countries over the 1960s and 1970s. 




Reforms of the investment climate and labor market outcomes 
  While a well-functioning labor market has a positive effect on investment climate, 
the opposite is also true: a well-functioning investment climate is essential to generate higher 
demand for labor and for enabling wages to rise.  This idea is well accepted, but some of the 
key reforms to promote the investment climate are often perceived as harmful for the 
workers.  Opinion pools in many developing countries, whether in Latin America, Central 
and Eastern Europe, Africa or even industrial countries, often reveal strong workers’ 
dissatisfaction on the outcomes of these reforms for the labor market.  Evidence suggests 
significant long-term benefits from a comprehensive reform of the investment climate, in 
terms of both access to better jobs and reduced unemployment and under-employment.  Most 
of these reforms, however, imply major changes with short-term costs, especially for workers 
in firms previously protected by trade barriers, state support or lack of competition, and for 
those with low skills or in declining areas.  Often, these costs are exacerbated by the fact that 
reforms are implemented in the aftermath of a major economic crisis when the choice of the 
reform package or its implementation occur when the economy is already undergoing painful 
adjustments.          
The long-term effects of reforms of the investment climate 
 Reforms of the investment climate  --  be it via enhancements in product market 
competition, greater transparency or more secure property rights -- have all the potentials for 
improving workers’ welfare, although their effects depend on the reform package and may 
not be instantaneous.  Successful reforms are expected to bring about higher wages and better 
working conditions, as well as higher employment and lower levels of unemployment and 
informality in the long-run (Figure 5a, b).
13   Empirical studies that have linked different 
structural reforms to labor market outcomes seem to confirm these points, although they also 
strongly underline the importance of a comprehensive and well tailored approach that is 
consistent with underlying economic conditions in each country.  For example, countries 
which have opened their economies to greater foreign trade have enjoyed higher economic 
                                                                                                                                                       
12 Ratha, Dilip.  2003.  Workers’ Remittances:  An Important and Stable Source of Development Finance, 
Presentation for Poverty Day October 16, 2003.  Washington DC: The World Bank. 




growth and higher wages compared to those which have persisted in the inward-oriented 
strategy.
14    
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14 See amongst others, Dollar and Kraay (2001); Rodrik (1997); Freeman (1994); Matusz and Tarr (1999); 




  Greater exposure to foreign competition strengthens incentives for firms to invest in 
new technologies and in enhancement of the human capital and skills of their workforce.  
Moreover, within each individual country, sectors exposed to stronger competitive pressure 
tend to have higher labor productivity and pay higher wages than those concentrated on the 
internal markets, even for workers of similar characteristics. De Ferranti et al. (2003) show 
that in Latin America both import-competing industries and export-oriented industries – i.e. 
those industries most exposed to foreign competition – tend to pay higher wages than non-
traded industries as services and commerce, even after controlling for differences in human 
capital, education and experience of workers.  This is because external competition 
stimulates the adoption of new technologies and these, in turn, require training and skill 
enhancements. In India wages were found to be higher in firms exposed to international 
competition, reflecting trade-induced productivity gains.
15  Similarly, there is evidence that 
foreign owned firms in developing countries tend to pay premium wages and provide better 
working conditions, which reflect their better productivity performance associated with 
foreign ownership and especially easier access to foreign markets and technologies.
16      
  Trade liberalization, however, is often singled out as the main cause behind greater 
economic volatility and greater income and job security for workers.  Open economies tend 
to be more exposed to fluctuations in global demand and to changes in relative prices.  From 
a long-run perspective, there is little evidence that trade liberalization has led per se to an 
increase in the year-to-year fluctuations in earnings, nor are wages more volatile in sectors 
more exposed to foreign competition – a result which applies to a wide range of countries in 
Asia and Latin America.
17   At the same time, there is no strong evidence that, by fostering 
competition amongst domestic firms, countries have increased the elasticity of labor demand 
with respect to wages: no such effect was found in India, Turkey and a sample of Latin 
American countries.
18  Likewise, structural reforms that promote productivity do not per se 
lead to a widening of wage disparities over the long run.  This holds true even if one looks at  
                                                 
15 See Epifani (2003). 
16 See Brown et al. (2003). 
17 Bourguignon and Goh (2003); de Ferranti et al. (2000). 




specific reforms such as an increase in trade openness (Figure 6a and b) or measures which 
increase the inflows of foreign direct investment.  There is also little evidence that trade 
liberalization and product market reforms have been associated with the loss of many “good” 
jobs and the expansion of low quality and poorly-paid jobs.  To the contrary, evidence 
indicates that jobs created in the emerging sectors appear to be better than similar jobs in the 
old sectors.
19      
 




























Note: This figures plots trade openness indicators against a standard measure of wage dispersion -- the  
standard deviation of the log wages of different occupations.  Each point in the figure corresponds to a 
country (with a total of 113 countries) and year (over the period 1983 – 1999).  See Rama (2003) for  
similar calculations.  
Source: Freeman (http://www.nber.org/oww/) and WDI (2003). 
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Source: Freeman (http://www.nber.org/oww/) and WDI (2003). 
 
The short-term adjustment costs.  
  Many of the reforms aimed at improving the investment climate, however, may well 
imply changes in the nature of jobs, with a decline in lifetime employment with generous 
benefits in sectors sheltered from competition and lower job tenure.  There are also short-
term adjustment costs - in terms of employment losses and major changes in relative wages - 
associated with most reforms. These costs can be large and protracted if the reallocation of 
resources associated with most structural reforms is sluggish, because relative prices do not 
adjust, because labor adjustment costs are high or because old jobs are destroyed before new 
jobs are created.  For example, empirical studies suggest that wages may well decline in the 
wake of trade liberalization, before they begin to rise again, usually at a higher pace.
20   
These asymmetric changes in sectoral wages are also associated with possible short-run 
increases in wage dispersion, which tends however, to fade away over time.
21     
                                                 
20 Rama (2003) suggests that the short-term effect of trade liberalization is negative while it becomes 
significantly positive over time.  By contrast, the positive short term effect of FDI on wages fades over time.  
These two results suggest that if the opening up of the economy fails to attract FDI, there may be initial wage 
losses.   
21 Behrman et al. (2000) suggest, in particular, that capital and financial market liberalization tend to widen 
wage disparities between the high and the low skilled because skilled labor is complementary to capital and 
effective domestic capital market is likely to facilitate financing of both current production and productivity-




  Moreover, structural reforms prompt large reallocation of resources, including labor. 
Job destruction and job creation might not be fully synchronized.  In many countries, and 
depending on the regulatory framework in product and labor markets (see section 2 of this 
paper), job destruction tends to proceed at a much faster pace than job creation.  IC reforms 
could thus be associated with some temporary increase in unemployment, or the expansion of 
informal activities especially in countries where workers cannot afford to remain without a 
job.  The point is however, that the high levels of unemployment emerging in the wake of 
economic reforms reflect the long adjustment periods, rather than final outcomes. 
  The short-term adjustment costs tend to be magnified if reforms are triggered by a 
crisis, as in Latin America after the debt crisis, in Sub-Saharan Africa following the sharp 
decline in commodity prices, or in transition economies after the collapse of the centrally-
planned system.  Adjusting to a fall in aggregate demand generally requires a decline in real 
wages.  In countries where real wages fell significantly, unemployment and under-
employment remained moderate, while in those where wage declines were moderated by 
institutional mechanisms, the adjustment cost largely manifested via higher unemployment.  
For example, Bolivia, Mexico, Indonesia, Russia and Ghana experienced large wage drops 
during their respective crises of the 1980s and 1990s with modest dis-employment effects, 
while in Chile, Argentina, the Republic of Korea and several Sub-Saharan African countries 
wage declines were less severe and the rise in unemployment was sharper. 
Who bears the burden of structural changes?  
 The adjustment costs associated with most structural reforms of the investment 
climate tend to be borne by the most vulnerable groups in the labor market: those with low 
levels of education, or with a specialization which is no longer demanded in the market, and 
those with little work experience or in geographical locations dominated by backward 
activities.  In developing and industrial countries alike, low skilled workers, youth and often 
prime-age women with little work experience tend to face a high incidence of 
unemployment, informality or low pay.  These unfavorable conditions for vulnerable groups 
tend to deteriorate even further during the initial phases of large-scale structural reforms.  




the low skilled face the greatest difficulties if they lose their jobs.   These  difficulties  can  be 
particularly severe if the adjustment process follows a crisis that has plunged the economy 
into a recession or if the renewal of growth takes longer than originally expected.   
  Women tend to be significantly affected by structural changes.  Those living in poor 
households are often asked, on top of their usual household responsibilities, to sustain 
household incomes when the wages of the male heads falls.  In rural areas of El Salvador and 
urban areas of Mexico, greater women participation is the “coping strategy” to weather 
income shocks associated with the loss of male job.  Moreover, when in the labor market, 
they often face higher unemployment risks than men, are disproportionally concentrated in 
low-wage sectors or occupations and often work in the informal economy.  There are 
however, large differences across countries and regions on how women fare in the labor 
market.  For example, in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa, women 
participation, although increasing, is still very low from an international perspective.  Laws 
protecting women’s rights in employment are largely not enforced in the private sector and 
public enterprises.  Moreover, family laws generally implemented in these countries mean 
that they are less flexible workers than men, and therefore less employable.  By contrast, in 
many transition economies, women tend to have similar unemployment rates than men with 
similar education and the gender wage gap has even declined over time.  However, the main 
concern for women in the region, as in most developing regions, is the tendency for working 
women to shift to informal economic activity.  
 More generally, workers with low skills tend to take most of the brunt of lower 
wages, unemployment and under-employment during structural changes.  Evidence from 
Latin America suggests that wage differentials between the high skilled and the low skilled 
have widened significantly during the period of structural reforms of the 1990s.
22  In Brazil 
the probability of falling into poverty during an economic slowdown is around 25-30 per cent 
for workers with no formal education, while less than 5 per cent for those with higher 
                                                 
22 Behrman et al. (2000) suggest an increase of about 50 per cent on average of the gap between the wages of 




education; and the probability of escaping poverty during an expansionary period is 10 per 
cent and more than 60 per cent, respectively for the two groups.
23   
  The uneven risk of job losses and poverty across workers with different skills is the 
result of different forces influencing relative wages and job opportunities.  Standard trade 
theory suggests that trade liberalization would stimulate the production of goods that used 
developing countries’ presumed abundant factor of production, unskilled labor, and raise its 
relative return.  At the same time, trade openness and other structural reforms have often 
increased access to new technologies which require high skills.  These two forces play a 
different role depending on the economic context.  In Latin America and in Central and 
Eastern Europe, skill biased technological changes seem to dominate, with a widening of 
wage and job disparities between the low skilled and those with higher skills.  This is even 
consistent with the standard theory; albeit lower than those in industrial countries, wages of 
low-skilled workers in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe tend to be high when 
compared with those of their counterparts in many South and East Asia countries.
24   More 
importantly, even when some least-skill-intensive part of the production process moves to 
developing countries, these processes are often skill intensive by local standards.
25   
Moreover, technological change, however induced, appears to increase the demand for 
skilled workers.  For example, evidence from Colombia, Mexico and Taiwan (China) 
suggests that firms investing in research and development or training of workers tend to have 
wider wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers than firms that do not.  In 
other words, the adoption of new technologies, which boost productivity and output growth, 
often requires skill upgrading.  This leads to an increase in wage premium to education and 
consequently a widening of the wage gap between less and more skilled workers.   
                                                 
23 See Neri and Thomas (2000). 
24 See Wood (1997) for a discussion on this point. 




The cost of inaction 
 The magnitude and concentration of the adjustment costs associated with most 
structural reforms bear the question as to how to minimize them if not altogether avoid them 
by preventing or even reverting reforms.  Avoiding structural reforms helps to avoid short-
term costs of adjustment, but deprives workers of reaping the benefits of higher productivity 
and faster economic growth.  Protecting the domestic economy from international 
competition neither leads to better jobs and working conditions, nor higher wages.  As the 
figures above demonstrate, there are no visible benefits of non-participation in the 
globalization process while there are clear costs in terms of forgone opportunities.  Lack of 
reforms seemingly preserves the status quo and maintains existing privileges.  However, in 
the end, lack of reforms turns against the very interests of those whose welfare was meant to 
be protected.  Economic hardship – rising unemployment or falling real wages – often reflect 
failure to carry out necessary reforms rather than the outcome of the reforms.  For example, 
in Latin America it was the countries which failed to fully tackle the issues of 
macroeconomic stabilization and labor market rigidities, rather than those that opened up the 
most, that did not succeed in bringing unemployment down and fostering employment 
creation.
26 
 Similarly, the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe which undertook 
radical structural reforms at the outset of the transition have achieved considerably better 
growth and often labor market outcomes over time than countries where reforms have been 
incomplete or limited (Figure 7).  In countries which successfully implemented radical 
reforms (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Baltic countries), the initial fall of 
output, employment and (to a lesser extent) wages was much deeper than in countries which 
have not taken the radical path (e.g. Belarus, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine).  However, the 
bold reformers also experienced a faster and stronger recovery, witnessing strong output, 
wage and (to a lesser extent) employment growth.  Wage inequalities have stabilized at a 
moderate level.   
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Source: EBRD Transition Report (various years); World Bank and ILO data. 
Note: The EBRD transition index is obtained by taking the simple average of the EBRD indexes on Price 
Liberalisation, Forex and Trade Liberalisation, Small-Scale Privatisation, Large-Scale Privatisation, Enterprise 
Reform, Competition Policy, Banking Sector Reform, and Non-Banking Financial Institutions. These indexes 
are reported each year in the Transition Reports 
 
 At the same time, cautious reformers and non-reformers in Central and Eastern 
Europe have seen labor market outcomes gradually deteriorate.  Underutilization of labor has 
been substantial (despite often low open unemployment) and, due to weak productivity gains, 
wage growth has been at best negligible.  Governments in these countries have attempted to 
forestall job destruction and prevent mass lay-offs but this has come at the price of low 
productivity of many existing jobs and of low job creation rate in the new sector of the 
economy (consisting largely of small private firms, which are the most dynamic in terms of 
job creation).  When job destruction could no longer be avoided, the lack of simultaneous job 
creation led to the build up of a large pool of unemployment and underemployment.  As a 
result, the new dynamic sector in non-reforming economics is relatively small, which 
significantly limits opportunities for gainful employment.  Limited access to high 
productivity jobs in turn tends to be associated with income inequalities.  Thus, contrary to 
what one could expect, low unemployment in those countries does not imply good labor 




 The experience of Sub-Saharan Africa is also illustrative of the importance of 
maintaining macro and micro reforms over time to improve labor market outcomes.  The 
dismaying growth performance in the 1980s triggered structural reforms in many countries of 
the region.  These reforms often focused on the removal of impediments to trade such as high 
import tariff, subsidies import quantity controls and fixed exchange rates.  The deregulation 
of domestic price controls was also implemented in many countries.  Moreover, reforms of 
the public sector aimed at reducing the large but underemployed and poorly paid workforce 
in the public sector, therefore reducing the huge budget deficits that were needed to finance 
the wage bill.   
  All of these reforms were expected to improve incentives, and promote efficiency in 
production and thus lead to an expansion in output, employment and wages.  In fact, while 
output has recovered in some countries, large downsizing of the public sector and strong 
population growth have not been matched by job creation in the private sector, leading to 
lower employment levels and real wage declines.  Indeed, the expectations of better labor 
market outcomes as a result of structural reforms were based on the assumption that the 
private sector was ready to harness the potentials of a more open and competitive 
environment.  However, weak and unstable institutions coupled with poor macroeconomic 
management often discouraged private sector initiatives.  This is not true in all countries of 
the region.  For example, in Ghana and Uganda, where reforms were implemented 
consistently, wages rose significantly.  By contrast, wages stagnated in Kenya, where the 
reform program was implemented erratically and was subject to many reversals during the 
past decade.  Likewise, in Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia, poor macroeconomic management led 
to high inflation and shrinking wages.
27 
                                                 
27 See Dabalen et al. (XX) and van der Geest and van der Hoeven (1999) for a discussion of the labor market 




2.  Governing worker-firm relations 
 Policymakers intervene in the worker-firm relations on two main fronts.  They set 
regulations for working conditions and the labor contract between workers and employers, 
and they fix wage floors and set the legal framework in which social partners operate.  These 
interventions are theoretically justified by the (perceived or effective) inability of laissez faire 
conditions to deliver efficient and equitable outcomes.  Efficiency arguments stress 
information problems and a need to promote matching between labor demand and supply.  
There may also be equity arguments if there is unequal bargaining power between employers 
and workers, potential discrimination against vulnerable groups, or incomplete or imperfect 
insurance of workers against risks.  Interest group politics also play a role. 
 Beyond the core labor standards—the minimum framework for a sound labor 
market (Box 1)—government interventions need to strike a balance between the incentives 
for firms to hire and innovate, and worker preferences for job protection and income stability.  
This balance is influenced by social preferences in each country.  But there has been a 
tendency in many low and middle income countries to over-regulate the labor market in an 
attempt to protect jobs.  Indeed, many developing countries have labor regulations that mimic 
or even exceed those of industrial economies—even if the latter have approached these 
conditions only gradually during their process of development. Indeed, while one might 
expect a positive relation between the level of mandated labor protection and income across 
countries (i.e. labor protection is a normal good), the relationship is in fact negative across a 





Box 1 The economic effects of core labor standards 
The international community has identified four core labor standards as the minimum requirement for 
all countries, whatever their stage of development:  eliminating all forms of forced or compulsory 
labor, abolishing child labor, providing equal opportunity and nondiscrimination in employment, and 
ensuring the  freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.  Most countries have 
signed conventions on forced labor and nondiscrimination, but a significant number of them have not 
signed those on the freedom of association and child labor. 
The economic effects of enforcing core labor standards depend on the interventions and socio-
political circumstances.  Ensuring the freedom of association and collective bargaining can go a long 
way to promoting labor market efficiency and better economic performance.  And there are obvious 
economic and social reasons for banning slavery and all forms of forced labor. But child labor and 
different forms of explicit or implicit discrimination, while generally perceived as violations of 
human rights, are still widespread in many low and middle income countries.   
Child labor still looms large in the developing world, where one in six children between the ages of 5 
and 17 are at work. Child labor hinders human development, reducing future earnings for the children 
themselves and aggregate growth potential of the economy.  For example, children in India perform 
tasks that require no particular skills and develop no human capital. And cheap child labor, if 
combined with poor investment conditions, reduces the incentives for firms to invest in new 
technology that have higher productivity potential but require more skilled workers. 
The timing and design of interventions to eliminate child labor are however crucial determinants of 
their success. Reforms that promote stronger economic growth are of tantamount importance. In 
Vietnam strong economic growth in the 1990s led to a significant rise in poor families’ wealth which 
in turn contributed to reduce the number of children in the workforce by 28 percent. And improving 
the delivery of education (including targeted educational subsidies), which gains parental support, is 
generally more effective than an outright ban on child labor.  Such bans are generally not enforced in 
many developing countries.  A ban can also force child laborers into more dangerous, hidden forms of 
work (prostitution), especially where parents have no choice but to use child labor as a risk 
management tool.  
Discrimination leads to the underuse and misallocation of human capital, creating inefficiencies and 
impeding economic growth.  It can also weaken the economic position of households because they 
cannot secure more income if they need to.  Household consumption may fall as a result of women’s 
inability to find work (e.g. in Jordan).  
Source: ILO (2004); Burra (1995); Edmonds (2004); Krueger (1996); Brown (2000), OECD (2000), Martin 
and Maskus (2001); Miles (2002). 
 If workers fully valued their benefits and were willing to trade them off for lower 
wages or greater effort, high levels of labor protection might not constrain firms' 
performance and job creation.  But when heavy regulation is not fully accommodated by 
wages or higher productivity, labor costs are raised and firms face strong pressures to avoid 




Latin America, firms in the formal sector bear up to 50 percent of the non-wage labor costs.
28  
The result is that many developing countries provide a relatively high standard of protection 
to a few workers but no, or minimal, protection for most of those in the unregulated 
economy.  So while a small proportion of the workforce gain, it is at the expense of workers 
in the informal economy or the unemployed. 
 The sheer magnitude of the informal economy in developing countries (often 
accounting for more than 50 percent of total workers) underscores this point (Box 2).  In 
many countries informal workers are a majority in the nonagricultural sector: they account 
for about 50 percent of total employment in Latin America, 45-85 percent in different parts 
of Asia, and more than 70 percent in Africa.
29  Evidence from several countries suggests that 
the size of the informal sector has increased in the past decade, with numerous workers 
moving back and forth between the formal and informal sectors. While some high-skilled 
workers may voluntarily opt out of the formal sector—to start a small business or to seek 
higher wages at the expense of unreliable social and health provisions—most informal 
workers receive lower wages and no or limited protection against old age, unemployment or 
sickness. 
  Striking a balance between protecting jobs or workers and promoting job creation by 
firms (the so-called efficiency-equity trade-off) is particularly contentious in a period of 
reforms when the long-term benefits of increased employment and wages are likely to be 
clouded by short-term concerns for the job and wage security of those affected during the 
transition.  Successful reforms bring about higher wages and better working conditions—as 
well as higher employment and lower unemployment and informality in the long run.
30  
However there are some short-term costs due to the changes in job characteristics and the 
greater labor mobility in a modern, productive economy.  Those costs can be large and 
protracted if the reallocation of resources is sluggish—because relative prices do not adjust, 
                                                 
28 Heckman and Pagés (2004) estimate that workers absorb between 52 and 90 per cent of the cost associated to 
non-wage benefits in Latin America. Gruber (1997) found that workers bear all the cost in the United States. 
Mondino and Montaya (2004) for Argentina and MacIsaac and Rama (1997) for Ecuador suggest that 
compliance with labor regulations implies an increase in labor costs with possible dis-employment effects. 
29 See International Labor Office (2002).  
30 See Bourguignon and Goh (2003); de Ferranti and others (2000); Gill, Maloney, and Sanchez-Paramo 




because labor adjustment costs are high, or because old jobs are destroyed before new jobs 
are created.    
 
Box 2: The characteristics of the informal sector 
The informal or “micro and small-enterprise” sector is far from homogeneous. It includes 
pre-entrepreneurial subsistence type of self-employment which functions as “the employer of last 
resort’. This is an important source of household income supplementing farming income. This type of 
activities, however, is unlikely to be evolving in size and to eventually emerge in the formal sector. 
Micro enterprises are somewhat bigger operations, involving family workers and apprenticeships and 
using more modern technology albeit obsolete. They are more linked with markets for the provision 
of inputs and have some potential for growth and maturing into formal businesses. Finally, small 
enterprises with 10 to 50 workers use more advanced technologies and are often on the margin of the 
formal sector. They are combined with high-skilled self-employed who prefer to stay in the gray 
economy and avoid paying taxes. See Mead and Liedholm (1998) for evidence in six countries: 
Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe 
Recent evidence points to great mobility between formal and different types of informal employment.  
For example, in Mexico and Argentina, one-third and one-quarter of workers changing job, 
respectively, move from a formal to an informal job or from an informal to a formal job (Informal 
workers are defined as those who do not receive the benefits mandated by labor laws. See the Inter-
American Development Bank (2003)).  In many low-income countries, however, informality 
conforms more to the classical view of a residual segment of the economy: in Egypt, for example, 
more than 90 per cent of workers without contract of social insurance in 1990 were still in the same 
condition ten years later (World Bank, 2003a).  Whether temporary or persistent, for most workers 
the shift from formal to informal jobs is involuntary and linked to lacking job opportunities in the 
formal sector.  Only high-skilled workers tend to move voluntarily to the informal sector either to 
start a small business by their own or to seek higher wages at the expense of losing health and social 
security benefits. Maloney (2004) reports evidence from Argentina, Mexico and Paraguay suggesting 
that a large fraction of workers move to the informal sector because of more flexibility, higher wages, 
or simply the desire to become entrepreneurs. In markets with flexible wages, the cost of 
employer-provided benefits is also likely to be passed on to workers in the form of lower wages. If 
social security and health provisions are perceived as inefficient or if linkages between contributions 
and benefits are weak, workers may prefer to move to the unregulated market where remuneration is 
entirely monetary. 
 
Intervening in the wage-setting process 
 The success of fostering opportunities for firms to invest productively largely 
depends on their ability to remunerate factors of production, including labor, according to 
their productivity and to adjust input prices to accommodate changes in demand.  Properly 
compensating workers also fosters their effort in the production process and strengthens their 
incentives to invest in human capital.  Governments intervene in the wage-setting process by 




reduce negotiation costs if they do not reinforce the monopoly power of the parties or impose 
rigidities in wage adjustments.  Many governments also set wage floors in an attempt to 
reduce the number of working poor, but setting the floors too high can reduce the jobs 
available for lower skilled people and the opportunities for low-tech firms to emerge in the 
formal sector.   
Providing a legal framework for collective bargaining.   
 The dialogue between freely elected (and representative) associations of workers 
and employers can reduce uncertainty and transaction costs and improve information flows.
31  
In countries where collective bargaining is not available, agreements amongst social partners 
are often replaced by cumbersome regulations set unilaterally by the government. Collective 
bargaining offers a platform for involving both employers and workers in discussions with 
government about structural reforms.  Consider the tripartite negotiations promoting macro 
and structural reforms in several western European countries in the past decade.  Also 
consider the pivotal role of unions in promoting political openness and democracy in other 
countries, as with Solidarity in Poland and black labor unions in South Africa.  However, 
under certain circumstances, unions may act as monopolists, improving wages and working 
conditions for their members at the expense of non-unionized workers and the economy.   
  Three main features of collective bargaining affect the flexibility of wages and the 
performance of firms.  First is the bargaining power of unions combined with the monopoly 
rent that can be shared between firms and workers.  The bargaining power of unions is 
generally measured by their membership. The latter varies across developing countries; it 
tends to be low in most of Asia and Africa, in part because many workers are involved in 
rural or informal activities, but fairly high in Europe.  Unionization has generally been 
declining in the recent past (Figure 8). This is most notable in former centrally-planned 
economies where membership fell from covering almost all workers in the 1980s to a 
minority of them a decade later. Declines have also been recorded in other areas, including 
most industrial economies and countries in Latin America. This decline occurred largely 
because union membership was often concentrated in manufacturing and public services, 
                                                 





both downsized substantially in many countries.
32 Moreover, increasing competition, the 
expansion of small firms in services and the development of temporary contracts have also 
contributed to reduce unionization. Saavedra and Torero (2004) estimate that the drop in 
unionization in Peru from 40 to 30 per cent in the second half of the 1980s was largely due to 
decline in government employment and the expansion of temporary employment. The 
authors also suggest that after 1992 the diminished protection granted to labor unions in Peru 
was the main reason behind the even sharper decline in unionization.
33   
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Source:  Rama and Artecona (2002). 
 
 The effects of unions on wages and economic conditions vary a great deal across 
countries and regions and largely depend on the economic and social environment in which 
they operate.  Union wage markups tend to be fairly small in industrial countries
34 but quite 
high in countries with weak competition in output markets and large rents.  Available 
                                                 
32 However, governments in a number of countries grant administrative extension of union wage agreement to 
non-union workers (often referred to as excess coverage), which raises unions’ power without forcing them to 
fully consider the economy-wide effects of wage agreement in their bargaining strategy.  
33 See also Zegarra and Ravina (2003) for a discussion in declined union density amongst teachers in Peru. 
34 The low union wage markup in most industrial countries is often due to the extension of collective 




estimates suggest high wage premia in Ghana (21-28 percent), Malaysia (15-20 percent), and 
South Africa (10-24 percent), but low premia in other countries, including the Republic of 
Korea (only 2-4 percent).
35  
  Unions also tend to reduce disparities in the wage distribution, and union members 
tend to enjoy longer job tenure and receive more training than their counterparts. In a number 
of countries, employers favor dealing with them, as highly representative unions can deliver 
less industrial unrest and fewer strikes.  However, some of these beneficial effects may come 
at the expense of those without jobs, especially if high union wage premia reduce job 
creation in the formal sector and if the poor mainly work in the informal sector.
36  The effects 
of unions on productivity are less clear-cut and depend on market conditions and industrial 
relations. For example, in Mexico unions have attempted to protect low-skilled jobs at the 
expense of higher productivity.
37  In Guatemala unionization is associated with lower 
productivity of coffee farmers.
38  Greater participation of workers in certain aspects of 
company management in Brazil contributed to better productivity and profitability.  The 
effect was greater in unionized companies because unions facilitated communication between 
management and workers.
39 
 An unstable political environment also tends to reduce incentives for unions to 
“invest” in wage restraint in exchange for better expected economic outcomes in the future.
40  
High union wage premia and bigger drags on productivity are found in countries and sectors 
lacking competitive pressure.  Investment climate improvements that enhance competition in 
output markets and economic stability are therefore likely to discipline union behavior into 
one more conducive to better outcomes for the economy.
41 
  A second feature shaping the impact of unions on firms and workers is the extent to 
which direct government intervention influences their behavior and representation.  In 
                                                                                                                                                       
per cent of the workforce) with one of the highest coverage rate of collective agreements (about 85 per cent of 
the workforce). See OECD (1997).   
35 Aidt and Tzannatos (2002). 
36 Harrison and Leamer (1997). 
37 Maloney and Ribeiro (2001). 
38 Urizar and Lee (2003). 
39 Menezes Filho and others (2002). 




several Latin American countries, the state controls participation at the bargaining table and 
legitimizes agreements.
42  It defines what type of unions can organize and in some cases 
requires state authorization for a union to form.  In Brazil only one union (sindicato) may 
exist in a given occupational category, and it has a monopoly in representing the 
corresponding workers.  In Mexico more than one union can exist, but only certified union 
leaders can engage in collective bargaining or call a strike.  Certification requires that unions 
be registered by the state.  In Egypt and Syria union activity is limited to one officially 
recognized union or confederation, often with some political interference.  In Zambia trade 
union unity is imposed on an enterprise, industry, occupational or geographical basis. 
 A third feature is the locus of negotiation and the coordination between different 
employers’ and workers’ organizations.  
•  Enterprise.  At one extreme, wages are negotiated at the enterprise level, as in many 
English-speaking industrial countries.  Decentralized wage bargaining ensures that 
wages reflect firm and individual worker performances.  That leads to significant 
aggregate and relative wage flexibility but also to a wide dispersion of earnings—and 
possibly some transaction costs for firms if wages are frequently renegotiated.   
•  Country.  At the other extreme, wages are negotiated at the national level among 
representative of employers, unions, and often the government.  The experience of 
some continental European countries suggests that centralized bargaining may allow 
for the aggregate economic effects of wage agreements (employment, inflation) to be 
factored in the negotiation if social partners represent the large majority of workers 
and firms.  This may ensure significant aggregate wage flexibility, but relative wage 
flexibility is often constrained, reducing the ability of firms to fully reward workers 
with firm-specific skills.   
•  Sector.  Between the extremes, wages are negotiated at the sectoral level.  This is 
common in Western Europe and in many developing and transition economies, where 
sectoral unions and employer associations negotiate wages for their sector or even for 
different occupations.  Unless the different sectoral bargaining units coordinate their 
                                                                                                                                                       




strategies—not frequent in developing countries—this bargaining regime may lead to 
limited aggregate and relative wage flexibility.
43  Why?  Because each bargaining 
unit is strong enough to push wages above productivity but at the same time is 
vulnerable to other units’ wage strategies without being able to influence them.   
 Over the past two decades there have been several attempts to improve the wage 
response to changes in demand conditions.   
 Promoting coordination. Some industrial countries with a tradition of collective 
bargaining have reinforced coordination among the different levels of wage negotiation 
(national, sectoral, firm).  In some of them, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland, 
nationwide agreements now fix only the basic wage increase, leaving to the firm-level 
negotiation further increases consistent with a firm’s performance. Unions have also been 
part of the design and implementation of large structural changes in many countries.  In 
Mexico and Israel, as well as in the Netherlands, Ireland, and Italy, unions have participated 
in the design of adjustment programs, including actions in the labor market, and agreed on 
social pacts that facilitated macro stabilization. 
 Reinforcing firm-level bargaining. Following the experience of other industrial 
countries—such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—some emerging and 
transition economies have reinforced wage responsiveness by shifting the wage bargaining to 
the firm level.  In the Baltic States, Czech Republic, and Hungary unionization is low in 
newly created private firms, especially small ones, and wage bargaining takes mostly place at 
firm level.
44  Along the same lines, the wage bargaining system in Peru was reformed in 
1992, increasing direct negotiation by relaxing the collective negotiation process, introducing 
voluntary arbitration as an alternative to state administrative decision, and eliminating state 
approval of agreements.  The reform also increased collective autonomy by protecting 
unions’ right to registration—and union pluralism by allowing more than one union to exist 
                                                                                                                                                       
42 See O'Connell (1999), Pencavel (1997). 
43 Strong coordination between unions and employers’ associations in an industry or regional bargaining 
settings (as observed in some industrial countries, e.g. Germany and Austria and, more recently, Italy, Ireland, 
the Netherlands) may be an alternative, or functionally equivalent, to centralized systems, thereby mimicking 
their outcomes.  





45  In other countries, where informal activities still dominate, unions have 
expanded their intervention by helping informal workers get credit, improve their human 
capital, and obtain health support (see Box 3). 
Box 3 Unions have taken on new roles 
Given the reductions in union membership and the size of the informal sector, unions in many 
developing countries have started to expand their engagement with the informal sector. A union in 
Argentina operates a health insurance and unemployment fund that also covers unregistered and 
unprotected agricultural workers.  In the Philippines unions initiated loan schemes for poor areas.  An 
agricultural workers’ union in Ghana includes self-employed rural workers as members, supports 
them through revolving loans, and facilitates their access to other forms of institutional credit.  And 
an Indian union helps unorganized and self-employed workers to obtain licenses (Ratnam (1999)).  In 
Sub-Saharan Africa unions have been active in dealing with the HIV/AIDS pandemic at the 
workplace.   
Associations of informal workers have been created, with some taking a high profile role in defending 
informal workers’ rights.  Examples include the Ghana Private Road Transport Union and the Cissin-
Natanga Women’s Association of Burkina Faso, and the Self Employed Women’s Association in 
India.   
Setting wage floors: the effects on low technology firms and the low skilled 
 The main objective of setting wage floors is to promote decent jobs and reduce 
poverty among workers.  They also tend to control market power that companies may have 
over individual workers who lack information, bargaining power or the ability to seek 
better-paid jobs.  This is particularly the case in mono-cultural areas, where a single company 
may account for the bulk of labor demand.  The effectiveness of wage floors in many low- 
and middle-income countries is however questionable.  Minimum wages tend to be fairly 
high compared with market wages in these countries, and any further increase would shift the 
entire wage distribution upward.  This concentrates the dis-employment effects among those 
they intended to support—young, low-skilled, and female workers.  When enforcement is 
weak, a hike in the minimum wage stimulates more underreporting of wages or further 
incentives for firms and jobs to remain in the informal economy.   
 The minimum wage cuts the lower end of wage distribution and makes firms and 
jobs with low productivity levels unviable, at least in the formal sector.  The level of the 
minimum wage affects firms, jobs, and income distribution.   
                                                 




  In industrial countries minimum wages tend to be relatively low (although in some 
cases may approach 50 percent of the median wage) with a modest impact on low-tech firms 
and the employment of low-productivity workers. Estimates suggest that in Colombia for 
every percentage point rise in the minimum wage, employment falls by 0.15 percentage 
points. See Maloney and Núñez (2004).  In Indonesia, the significant increases in provincial 
minimum wages had some dis-employment effects in small firms, but not in larger firms, 
although it was also associated with an increase in the number of workers below the 
minimum wage. See Alatas and Cameron (2003). 
  In several low-income countries minimum wages are close to, if not higher than, the 
average wage (Figure 9).
46  At these levels, many private firms, especially those in low-tech 
activities, cannot afford to comply. This goes against the purpose of establishing a minimum 
wage as the poor tend to work in informal activities for only a fraction of the mandated 
minimum wage. 
  Figure 9: The minimum wage is very high in many low income countries, and at high 
levels leads to weak enforcement 
Relative minimum wage declines with income   High levels of the minimum wages lead to high evasion in 
Latin America 
Note: The wage used in the right panel for comparison is the median wage for workers between 26 and 40 years 
old that work for more than 30 hours in the reference period of the surveys. 
Source: Left panel:  Rama and Artecona (2002); Right panel: IDB based on countries official data. 
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  In middle-income countries, the minimum wage is generally about half the average 
in the formal sector.  Its coverage and enforcement tend to be low, but its impact on 
low-productivity firms and jobs can be large.  In Latin America, for example, the largest 
proportions of workers who earn less than the minimum wage are found in countries where it 
is comparatively high—as in Paraguay, where the majority of workers earn less than two-
third of the minimum wage, Nicaragua (40 percent of workers below the minimum), and 
Colombia (25 percent).
47 
  Noncompliance with the minimum wage is concentrated among the most vulnerable 
workers.  The minimum wage represents a higher proportion of the available wage for youths 
and other workers lacking work experience.  In addition, it may be close to the underlying 
regional average in backward areas, severely affecting labor demand for small and medium 
firms that rely largely on low-skilled workers. For example, in Poland the national minimum 
wage accounts for over 80 percent of the going market wage in backward areas, contributing 
to high unemployment among low skilled workers, World Bank (2001a). Despite the low 
compliance, the minimum wage operates as a strong pay signal for the informal sector.  This 
implies that hikes in the minimum wage can have distributional implications that go beyond 
the formal sector: the income of the low paid might increase in both segments of the 
economy, but the employment prospects for them might decline.
48 
 Graduating wage floors to promote the formalization of low-skilled activities. 
Several countries have reduced the minimum wage relative to the average wage, largely by 
reducing its indexation and having lower subminima for some groups (young workers) or for 
subnational labor markets.  The effects can be marked.  For example, the erosion of the 
minimum wage in Mexico in the 1990s is estimated to have boosted female employment.  
Subminimum apprenticeship wages are available in many industrial countries (such as 
Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, Portugal, and Spain) and are being tested in several 
                                                 
47 The relationship between compliance and the level of the minimum wage is not one to one, as for most other 
regulations, and depends on the overall institutional climate and respect for laws, as shown in Continental 
European countries and Chile where high levels of the minimum wage are largely enforced. 
48 For more details on the role of the minimum wage as a price signal for the informal sector in Latin America 




developing countries, including Chile and Colombia.  They are estimated to have 
significantly increased job opportunities for young graduates in Chile.
49   
Setting workplace regulations 
  Promoting better health and safety conditions in firms, regulating working time, and 
encouraging paid annual leave have been major achievements in all societies.  As in most 
other areas of public policy, improvements in working conditions in industrial countries have 
evolved gradually, hand in hand with more general economic progress. By contrast, many 
low- and middle-income countries have skipped the intermediate steps, and directly adopted 
far-reaching workplace regulations—in some cases going beyond what exist in many 
industrial countries (Figures 10 and 11, Tables 3 and 4).  Even among countries at similar 
stages of development, the differences in workplace regulations are staggering (Figure 12A, 
B, C), with significant effects on labor costs and the ability of firms to accommodate 
fluctuations in demand. 
Figure 10: Most developing countries have stringent workplace regulations 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Europe and Central Asia
Industrial Countries Others
Latin America and Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
East Asia and Pacific
Industrial Countries Common Law
Average index on annual leave and hours worked
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from World Bank Doing Business Database (2004)  
Note: The index of condition of employment reported in this Figure is the normalized sum of: maximum 
number of hours in the workweek; overtime work, night shifts, holiday, hours of work, vacation days and 
whether paid time off for holiday is mandatory. The index captures what is written in laws and regulations and 
does not take into account possible cross country differences in the degree of enforcement of such laws and 
regulations.  
                                                 
49 See Feliciano (1998) for Mexico and Gill, Montenegro, and Domeland (2002a) for the experience of Latin 




Figure 11: Many developing countries have more stringent regulations on hiring and firing 
than industrial countries 
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East Asia and Pacific
Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and North Africa
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Summary indicator of the stringency of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
Regular EPL Temporary EPL
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from World Bank Rapid Response Database.  
 
Table 3: Regular employment protection varies across countries. 
 
Legally mandated notice period for redundancy dismissal 
(in weeks) after twenty years of continuous employment 
Severance pay for redundancy dismissal as number of 
months for which full wages are payable after continuous 
employment of twenty years 
Developing and transition countries (except high income) 
Least   Weeks  Most  Weeks  Least  Month
s 
Most Months 
Panama  0  DR Congo  28  Jamaica, Uganda.  0  Sierra Leone  41 
Colombia, Fiji, 
Nicaragua 
2 Lebanon  17.3      Lao  PDR  36 
          Brazil  31 
          Guinea, 
Mozambique 
30 




          Sri  Lanka  25 
             
Industrial (and other high income) countries 

























Table 4: Temporary employment protection is low in many developing countries 
Maximum duration of fixed-term contracts (in months) 
Developing and transition countries (except high income) 
Least restrictive  Months  Most restrictive  Months 
Albania, Bangladesh, Botswana, Cambodia, China, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt Arab Rep., Estonia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, 
India, Iran Islamic Rep., Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lao PDR, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, 
Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Yemen Rep., Zambia, Zimbabwe. 










Industrial (and other high income) countries 
Least restrictive  Months  Most restrictive  Months 
Australia, Austria, Canada, Hong Kong (China), Israel, Korea, Kuwait, 
New Zealand, Norway, Puerto Rico, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom, United States. 
No limit  Sweden  12 
Source: Doing Business database (2005) 
  Improving workplace safety is an important goal for all countries, and well-designed 
regulations can help to achieve this goal. The beneficial impact of such regulations may 
however be limited if they, or other features of labor regulation, have the effect of keeping 
firms and workers in the informal economy, where workers usually lack any statutory 
protection. Stronger enforcement can help in some cases. However, when regulations are out 
of step with local realities, there will be tradeoffs between providing a high level of 
protection to workers in regulated employment and reaching a broader group of workers. 
 Most countries have regulations for the workweek.  Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Ireland, Malaysia, Morocco, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam all allow 48-hour workweek.  
Most western European countries have 40-hour limits, with France recently moving to a 35-
hour workweek.  To promote flexibility, some countries have revised regulations to allow 
managers to shift work time from periods of slow demand to peak periods.  For example, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Spain leave to social partners to 
agree on the annualization of working hours. 
 In cyclical or seasonal industries, firms often use overtime work to accommodate 
demand.  In Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Jamaica, Hong Kong (China), Spain, and the United 
Kingdom, firms do not have to pay a premium for overtime, while in Bangladesh, Belarus, 
India, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan it is very costly, up to twice the regular pay. 
 The duration of paid annual leave is also subject to regulation.  Many African 
countries have generous annual leave schemes—from 30 days in Burkina Faso to 33 in 




30 days.  Regulations in the United States leave the decision on annual leave to individual or 
collective agreements. 
 All these regulations improve conditions for workers in the formal sector and, by 
promoting better working conditions and motivation, can promote their productivity.   
Beyond any potential productivity effect, the impact on firm performance depends on who 
ultimately bears the costs.  As discussed above, wages do not fully adjust to compensate for 
the additional costs for firms in many countries, reducing firms’ potential for expansion and 
job creation.  It could be argued that these negative effects may not be a source of concern if 
they reflect the rational choice of workers to trade off not only lower earnings, but also some 
unemployment, for greater security at work and decent working conditions.   
  A country would suffer from excessive regulation if lawmakers went beyond what 
workers were willing to pay or contribute in order to achieve these benefits.  This issue is 
particularly relevant in low- and some middle-income countries where regulations are even 
more generous than in industrial countries.  Those regulations might reduce wages below 
what poor workers would be willing or able to accept—and promote unregulated and 
unprotected employment, for which no control is available concerning workplace safety, and 
no protection against sickness, unemployment or ageing exist. In other words, overly 
ambitious mandatory benefit regulations result in good benefit packages for a few and no 
protection at all for the majority of workers. 
Balancing employment stability with firms’ need to adjust the workforce 
 Probably the most controversial government intervention in the labor market is 
setting rules for hiring and firing workers.  By affecting the cost of workforce reorganization, 
employment protection legislation strongly influences the cost of doing business, but 
especially the incentives and opportunities for firms to exploit new technologies and expand.  
Legislation on temporary labor contracts --  fixed-term and temporary agency 
employment -- generally pertain to: (i) the types of work (e.g., occupations) for which these 
forms of employment are legal, and (ii) the maximum duration allowed.  Restrictions on 
termination of contracts for workers with a permanent position can take various forms, 




obligations; (iii) advance notice requirements; and (iv) administrative procedures for 
dismissing workers (including the role of trade unions).  There may also be special 
requirements in the case of mass layoffs.  These regulations are often found in national or 
sub-national labor codes but, depending on the country, the degree of employment protection 
can also be defined by court decisions, sectoral collective bargaining agreements, or even 
unwritten industrial norms. 
Regulating hiring and firing 
 The protection offered to regular workers and the conditions for temporary 
employment vary considerably across regions (Figure 11) and within region (Figures 12A, B, 
and C).  Countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia tend to offer the most 
employment protection for regular workers.
50  By contrast, “common law” industrial 
countries and East Asian economies have the lowest statutory protection.
51 Countries within 
each region set significantly different rules for temporary employment.  Thus, Latin 
American countries and some Southern European economies restrict fixed-term contracts to 
specific tasks and/or limit the duration to one year, while several transition economies have 
recently liberalized temporary contracts.  Cross-country differences are even larger on firing 
rules.  Some countries, including Ghana, Israel and the United Kingdom have “contract at 
will” where the employment relation can be terminated by either party at any time.   Most 
countries allow the termination of contracts under a list of “fair” causes, but the list can be 
very narrow, as in Bolivia where redundancy is not considered a fair cause for dismissal.  
Advance notice and severance payments range from a few days and a small proportion of the 
wage to several months and high compensation.  For example in Sri Lanka, dismissed 
                                                 
50 Heckman and Pagés (2004) provide an alternative measure of job security that takes into account the 
monetary transfer that by law a firm has to pay to a worker on dismissal. This indicator confirms that dismissing 
a worker in Latin America involves a larger mandatory transfer to the worker than it would in industrial 
countries.    
51 The synthetic indicator of the strictness of regulations in case of dismissal of workers with permanent 
contracts is the normalized sum of the following components: i) procedural inconveniences that employers face 
when trying to dismiss a worker; ii) notice and severance payments; iii) prevailing standards of and penalties for 
“unfair” dismissals; and iv) procedures that employers must follow and approval they must seek prior to 
collective dismissals. Indicators of the stringency of EPL for temporary contracts refer to: i) the “objective” 
reasons under which they could be offered; ii) the maximum number of successive renewals; iii) and the 
maximum cumulated duration of the contract. For information on the underlying data see Djankov and others 




workers receive 2-3 months of salary for each year of service, and severance payments in 
some cases exceed 40 months’ wages. 
 
Figure 12: Labor market regulations disparities within regions 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from World Bank Doing Business Database (2004). 
 
 
Procedures for dismissal are often cumbersome and opaque.  In Sri Lanka the 
government decides the amount of compensation for laid-off workers and has the authority to 
reject employer demands.  The time needed for processing the request for a layoff can be 
highly unpredictable, taking on average six months but much more if the procedure involves 
hearings where employers explain their financial performance and business plans to the 
government to justify the layoff.  In Russia, before the reform of the labor code, trade unions 
had veto power over dismissals for staff reductions or for employees not suited to the job.
52  
In Brazil representatives of employers and workers used to sit on the jury of labor courts, a 
practice that often led to protracted judicial procedures and difficulties in reaching 
compromise.  Because of the complexity of the severance pay schemes, more than 6 percent 
of all salaried workers (about 2 million) usually file a lawsuit every year.  Before 1999 the 
average labor dispute usually took almost three years.  A change that year restricted the jury 
to professional lawyers and cut the time to resolve a dispute by half.
53 
  
                                                 
52 See World Bank (2003e). 




Box 4:  Labor regulation and global integration 
Differences in labor regulations and their enforcement might give a cost advantage in internationally 
traded goods to countries with weak regulations.  And new technologies allow labor services to be 
directly subcontracted to workers in countries with less stringent regulation.  This has led to concerns 
that multinational companies are taking advantage of weak labor regulations or putting pressure on 
governments for not enforcing existing regulations.  And advocacy groups have launched boycotts 
and other demonstrations against this, especially against firms in apparel and footwear. 
“Race to the bottom”? 
Evidence of noncompliance with labor regulations abounds in low and middle income countries.  But 
there is no clear evidence that this is related to greater integration in the world market.  This is true 
whether greater integration is measured by export market shares, revealed comparative advantages, 
foreign direct investment, or trade prices.  And trade sanctions have been shown to be 
counterproductive, potentially harming the people they aim to protect.   
Even in export processing zones—which have often been seen as attempts to promote investment by 
local and foreign firms by offering regulation-free conditions—there is not overwhelming evidence of 
suppressed labor rights, at least no more than what is observed outside the zones.  Of 73 zones 
reviewed in a recent study, in only six was there found to be any deliberate attempts by government to 
restrict workers’ rights. 
Or better contracts for workers? 
A body of evidence suggests that multinational firms are providing better working conditions, paying 
higher wages than alternative local employment, and do not suppress workers’ rights. The World 
Bank's Productivity and Investment Climate Surveys also suggests that foreign-owned firms tend to 
have a larger share of workers with permanent contracts and to provide more training opportunities to 
their workforce.  
Multinational firms also favor countries with a stable political and social environment, in which civil 
liberties are well established and enforced.  Such environments are typically more conducive to laws 
being applied evenly to foreign and domestic firms.  Moreover, many multinationals are burnishing 
their reputations by establishing codes of conduct, in line with existing standards or codes.   
From a review of 246 voluntary codes of conduct of firms, it appears that the treatment of labor issues 
varies across codes, from mentioning them in passing to committing to specific actions, such as 
creating a reasonable working environment and complying with the law. Compliance with codes is 
monitored by the buyers and often by the independent social auditors they hire.   
Poor working environment conditions are, however, the reality of many workers at the end of the 
supply chain. And only recently have some multinationals revised their purchasing practices and 
improved compliance with labor standards by local subcontractors.   
Source:  OECD (2000), Krumm and Kharas (2003); Basu (1999), Maskus (1997); OECD (2000); Brown, 
Deardorff, and Stern (2003); World Bank (2003d); OECD (2001); Raworth (2004) 
Minimum standards for hiring and firing procedures can benefit both workers and 
firms (Box 4).  For example, by reinforcing job security, they can enhance productivity, as 
workers will be more willing to cooperate with employers.
54 To the extent that job protection 
                                                 




leads to long-lasting work relationships, it may encourage employers to provide training.  A 
better skilled workforce may also increase internal flexibility and thus lead to a better 
functioning of production activity.
55  Job protection may also be a way to internalize the 
social costs of dismissals by moving the social burden of re-allocating a worker to another 
job closer to the firm’s profitability criteria.
56 
  Given the high level of protection granted to workers in the formal sector in many 
developing countries, it is not surprising that managers often consider such regulations as a 
major obstacle for the expansion of their firm.  When asked to evaluate eight areas for the 
burden regulations impose on the operation and growth potential of their business, they 
ranked labor regulations as the major or second-most important obstacle in many countries of 
Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and South Asia.  There is a close correlation 
between managers’ perceptions of employment regulations and the stringency of such 
regulations from an international perspective (Box 5). 
In fact, overly stringent regulations — those at odds with the international experience 
and with the stage of development of the economy  —  affect different aspects of firms’ 
performance, including spending on innovation, the entry of new firms, their average size, 
and the incidence of informality. 
 Cost of doing business and exploiting technological opportunities.  Overly strict 
hiring and firing rules tend to raise the cost of workforce reorganizations, reducing incentives 
for firms to innovate and adopt new technologies.  Evidence from industrial countries 
suggests that stricter rules are associated with lower R&D expenditure and tend to tilt 
specialization away from high-tech industries.  A cross-country study suggests that by 
reforming their labor rules to the OECD average, countries with very strict employment 
regulations could reduce their productivity gap with the technological leader by about 20 
                                                 
55 See amongst others Piore (1986). 





57  Similar reforms in developing countries can yield even larger productivity gains, 
given the greater potential for adopting technologies available in international markets.   
Box 5 Do employers’ perceptions square with actual labor regulations? 
Two main approaches have been used in the literature to assess the importance of regulations in 
different markets.  The first is based on international comparisons of formal laws and regulations 
aimed at benchmarking countries and identifying best practices.  When noncompliance with 
regulations is high—as in the case of labor regulations in many developing countries – international 
comparisons may give rise to inaccurate assessment.  Moreover, labor laws are often complex and 
interact with other government regulations. The second is to ask those directly affected by specific 
regulations, employers and workers.  But perceptions are subjective and likely to depend on national 
and cultural and on the stage of the business cycle. Cross-country comparisons therefore remain 
difficult with these subjective evaluations. 
The World Business Environment Survey of the World Bank ask managers how problematic they 
found regulations in different areas, including labor, for the operation and growth of their companies. 
The survey focuses on 73 industrial and developing countries. Overall, the raw data suggest that close 
to 70 percent of respondents reported some concern (minor, moderate, or major) about labor market 
regulations.  Around 15 percent report that these regulations are a major obstacle to the operation and 
growth of their business. 
These data on how employers perceive labor regulations were combined with an indicator of the 
strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) discussed in the main text.  The analysis 
suggests that the higher the stringency of regulations, the greater the likelihood that employers will 
report that labor regulations are a major obstacle.  In other words strict labor regulations, even if not 
fully enforced, affect firms’ performance by limiting the opportunities open to managers.  Both small 
firms and large seem to be less concerned with labor regulations; medium-sized firms are most 
affected.  And firms downsizing are more likely than the average to report that labor regulations are a 
major obstacle.  This suggests that labor regulations are more problematic for employers who face a 
crisis and have to lay off workers.  Employers whose business is expanding are on average less 
concerned. 
The perception of the burden of labor regulations varies across countries and firms 
 By stringency of actual regulations






                                                 
57 See Nicoletti and others (2001) for the evidence on the relationship between R&D and labor regulations.  See 
Scarpetta and others (2002) and Scarpetta and Tressel (2003) for evidence of the impact of employment 
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The figures are based on a sample of 8,000 firms in 64 countries around the world. All estimations control for 
age and size of firms, region and public ownership.  
Source: Pierre and Scarpetta 2004; Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes (2000); Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone (2002). 
 
 Creative  destruction.  Stringent regulations also have repercussions on the turnover 
of firms in the market.  Since new firms are often better at harnessing new technologies than 
incumbent firms, the regulations reduce the potential for productivity gains.  Micro data for 
19 industrial and developing economies suggest that countries with flexible hiring and firing 
rules experience significantly higher entry rates of small firms (but not micro enterprises, 
often exempt from such regulations or managing to avoid them).  Stringent rules also tend to 
discourage foreign direct investment, especially in countries where rules are opaque and 
enforcement is uncertain.
58   
 Self-employment and informality.  Strict labor rules are associated with larger 
proportions of self-employed, informal firms, and small firms.
59  Firms facing high labor 
adjustment constraints either remain very small—and more or less informal and thus exempt 
from employment regulations—or move to a higher scale, at which hiring and firing costs 
play a smaller role in total expected adjustment costs.  Information from the World Bank's 
Productivity and Investment Climate Surveys also suggests greater use of training by large 
firms to adjust the internal workforce.  These firms may also be able to obtain special 
treatment from local or national authorities to circumvent rigid rules, or exploit their 
bargaining power.  In Russia many large firms have circumvented strict regulations by 
encouraging workers to leave the firm voluntarily, through wage arrears, prolonged 
                                                 
58 See Görg (2002) and Dewit, Gorg, and Montagna (2003) for evidence of the effects of employment protection 




administrative leaves, reduced hours, and other forms of deteriorating working conditions.  
With no future in the firm and no source of income, many workers eventually quit.
60 
 Winners and losers from stringent employment protections.  To the extent overly 
restrictive regulations reduce the potential for firm expansion and job creation, they also 
impede workers’ access to jobs.  More job stability for some may imply fewer job 
opportunities for others.  So it is not surprising that stricter job protection rules do not lead to 
a more equal labor market.  If anything, income disparities are greater in countries with 
stricter regulations.
61 
  Strict regulations in industrial countries, where enforcement is high, tend to promote 
job stability for prime-age males, but tend to reduce job opportunities and lengthen 
unemployment spells for youths, women lacking work experience, and those with low 
skills.
62  Firms may become reluctant to hire new workers from these groups for fear of 
incurring expensive dismissal costs in the future. It is not surprising that the incidence of 
long-term unemployment (more than 12 months without a job) is very low in the United 
States (6 percent of total unemployment) and other countries with moderate employment 
protection legislation, while it is more than 50 percent in Belgium, France, Italy and Spain, 
which have stricter labor regulations. 
 When enforcement is weak, as it is in many low and middle income countries, 
stringent regulations do not reduce the size of labor reallocation, but they do change its 
nature and reduce its effectiveness.  In Argentina—a country with fairly rigid labor 
regulations—job flows had a negative contribution to aggregate productivity growth in the 
past decade, as many workers transited from formal jobs to lower productivity jobs in the 
informal sector.
63  In some transition countries lagging behind in market-oriented reforms, 
                                                                                                                                                       
59 See Nicoletti and others (2001) on self-employment; Nicoletti and others (2001) for the evidence on firm size; 
and Scarpetta and others (2002) for the evidence on size of entrant firms and post-entry expansion.  
60 According to a recent study, nonpayment of contractual obligations, or wage arrears, spread to nearly 60 per 
cent of all workers in Russia in 1998 and, despite declining, continues to affect a significant share of the 
workforce; see World Bank (2003e).  
61 See Pagés and Montenegro (1999), and Montenegro and Pagés (2004) for Latin America. Djankov and others 
(2003), using a sample of 85 countries, suggest that an increase of 1 point in their employment laws index (from 
0.76 to 2.40) is associated with an increase in the share of the unofficial economy in GDP of 6.7 percentage 
points and an increase in the share of unofficial employment of 13.8 percentage points.  
62 See Addison and Teixeria (2001) and Nickell and Layard (1999) for surveys of the literature for industrial 
countries.  




stringent labor regulations have not prevented job destruction, instead discouraging job 
creation in the formal economy.  This has led to job destruction leading job creation (or 
highly unsynchronized job flows) and the buildup of a large pool of unemployed or informal 
workers (Figure 13).  Women, youths, and the unskilled—facing greater difficulties in 
obtaining a job in the formal sector—are more frequently unemployed or engaged in 
informal activities. 
Figure 13: If job creation and destruction are not synchronized, they may give rise to 
unemployment or underemployment 
Source: Bartelsman and others (2004), Brown and Earle (2004). 
 
Promoting labor reallocation and the formalization of work relations   
 Evidence from a few countries that have recently changed job security regulations 
illustrates the potential benefits of reforming overly stringent labor legislation. 
  Reducing labor adjustment costs.  Colombia and Peru liberalized their employment 
protection in the 1990s, moving their legislation closer to the standards of the (still quite 
regulated) European industrial countries.  The reforms led to a higher response of 
employment to output growth, with speedier employment adjustment but also positive 
employment effects.  In Colombia the reform also contributed to increased compliance with 
labor legislation by lowering the costs of formal production (Figure 14).  Spain and Italy also 
experienced sizable positive effects on employment associated with some easing of their very 





































































































































restrictive firing regulations during the past decade.
64  A study in India suggests that 
amendments to the strict employment regulation in one state (Andra Pradesh) in the 1980s 
allowed 1.8 million urban poor to find a job in manufacturing and service companies in the 
next decade.  By contrast, in another Indian state (West Bengal) about 2 million poor people 
would have found jobs had the state not passed stricter regulations on dismissal and work 
hours over the past decades.
65 
Figure 14: Since the labor reform of 1990, there has been a higher job turnover at incumbent 
firms and stronger job creation at new firms in Colombia 
Source:  Bartelsman and others (2004). 
 
  Liberalizing temporary contracts: blessing or curse? Several countries in Continental 
Europe and more recently in Latin America and especially in Central and Eastern 
Europe have also tried to increase the adaptability of the labor market by liberalizing fixed 
term contracts and temporary work.  Business surveys in many developing and transition 
countries suggest that firms facing strict regulations of permanent contracts make greater use 
of temporary employment to foster the adaptability of their workforce.
66  However, 
liberalizing temporary contracts while leaving in place strict regulations on permanent 
                                                 
64   See Kugler and Pica (2003) for evidence in Italy.  
65   See Besley and Burgess (2004). 
66   See Pierre and Scarpetta, Background note for the World Development Report 2005.  In South Africa, 
more than 90 % of large firms report to make greater use of temporary workers in order to increase flexibility of 
the workforce; and 50% of them reduce, at the same time, the share of permanent workers (see Chandra and 
others (2001)). Interestingly, while about one-third of formal micro enterprises use temporary employment, the 
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contracts reinforces the inequality in the labor market, with negative consequences for firms’ 
performance.  Firms will have stronger incentives to hire more workers at the entry level, 
employ them for a limited period without giving them a permanent position thereafter.  This 
increases job turnover but not necessarily overall employment or productivity, as the 
additional hires will be accompanied by additional layoffs at the end of the temporary 
contracts and there will be no, or little, development of the internal human capital.
67 
Synergies between reforms in labor and other markets  
 The insider power of workers employed in firms sheltered from competitive 
pressures (either by legal, administrative, and trade restrictions or by public ownership) can 
be compounded by unduly restrictive employment protection, pushing up wage premia and 
lowering output and employment.  In this context, improving property right protection can 
have large implications on labor supply and workers’ productivity.  For example, issuing 
property titles to urban households in Peru led to a major increase in the labor supply, with 
shifts away from work at home to work in the market and to substitution of adult labor for 
child labor.
68    
 The effects of regulatory reform are likely to differ depending on the initial 
combination of regimes and on the sequencing of the reforms in product and labor markets.  
Evidence suggests that high job security may lead to adverse effects of trade liberalization on 
the coverage of labor laws and social protection: in highly regulated labor markets, trade 
reforms may lead employment shifts from jobs covered by labor law to jobs not covered.
69  
Colombia’s trade liberalization was associated with increased informal employment in 
industries with the largest tariff cuts, but once labor market reforms were introduced this 
                                                 
67 Evidence from France, Spain, Argentina, Peru and Colombia suggests that the asymmetric liberalization of 
contracts has led to significant shifts towards precarious jobs.  In Argentina and Spain these reforms were 
reversed after a few years and, in the latter country, net job creation has really picked up only after the 
government reformed permanent contracts in the mid 1990s.  In Spain temporary employment reached almost 
one-third of the total workforce after the reform of temporary contracts in the mid-1980, Dolado, García-
Serrano, and Jimeno (2001). In Peru, the liberalization of temporary employment in the early 1990s led to an 
increase in temporary employment from 20 in 1990 to 55 per cent in 2000. In Colombia there was a similar 
large increase, Saavedra (2003). See also Blanchard and Landier (2001) for France and Hopenhayn (2004) for 
Argentina.    
68 See Field (2002). 
69 In this context, Agénor (1996) argues that the effectiveness of structural adjustment programs in developing 




pattern was reversed.  Similarly, Indian states with less stringent labor regulations 
experienced stronger growth in the formal sector than those adopting stricter labor 
regulations.
70  
3.  Helping workers cope with insecurity and promoting entrepreneurship 
  In a world where from 20 to 30 per cent of existing jobs are created or destroyed in 
any given year, how to insure against the cost of job loss and how to facilitate the access to a 
new one become key priorities for policy makers.  Dealing with labor mobility and the 
associated economic insecurity requires a comprehensive approach.  From an individual 
perspective, there are three main strategies of dealing with economic risks: i) preventive 
measures to reduce the occurrence of a shock (e.g. unemployment) or its effects (long 
duration of joblessness) for example by investing in human capital throughout the working 
life
71; ii) mitigating the risk, for example by holding multiple employment (often with 
detrimental effects on specialization and future earnings); or pooling the risk across 
individuals through formal (such as unemployment insurance) or informal insurance (such as 
private transfers); or pooling the risk across time such as self-insurance through 
precautionary savings in good times; and iii) coping with the shock once occurred, often with 
non-optimal reactionary strategies such as recurring to child labor.  The ex-ante measures of 
dealing with the risk – prevention and  mitigation – in many cases call for individual pro-
activity and can be based on provisions by the private sector, but require, in all cases, 
appropriate government regulation and supervision.  In some instances, such as 
unemployment insurance, public mandating or public provision and financing is required.  
Social assistance –including cash transfers (with build-in work incentives), in-kind benefits 
and services – are risk coping mechanisms that allow governments to reduce the impact of a 
negative income shock, especially amongst those who are less able to protect against them -- 
informal workers and the poor. 
  Mandated provision of unemployment benefits to the unemployed or 
under-employed is required because such programs cannot be handled efficiently by private 
                                                 
70 See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) for Colombia and Aghion and Burgess (2003) for India. 
71 See de Ferranti et al.(2000), Holzmann and Jorgenson (2001), and World Bank (2001b and 2003c) for an 




providers given strong information asymmetries and the associated moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems.  Moral hazard arises because unemployment insurance reduces self-
protection; adverse selection arises because information problems prevent insurers from 
charging higher premiums to bad risks compared with poor risks.  Correcting for market 
failures calls not only for regulation in the form of obligatory membership to avoid the 
problem of adverse selection, but also for its public provision, to improve monitoring 
capacity and financial sustainability of the program.  Public provision of social risk 
management programs also enhances the ability to pool resources across large groups, 
lowering the strain on the system arising from the covariant nature of unemployment risk. 
 The potential benefits of social risk management programs go well beyond the 
welfare of the unemployed or the poor but potentially enhance efficiency and the proper 
allocation of resources.  First, social insurance schemes can stimulate the emergence of more 
risky, but more productive, jobs and industries.
72  The few available estimates suggest that 
the potential gain in income levels through access to appropriate risk management 
instruments may be sizeable.  Bringing insurance to similar levels to those of richer 
households could raise average incomes of the un-protected poor by about 25 per cent (in 
rural Tanzania) to 50 per cent (in a sample of rural villages in India).
73  Second, it can be 
argued that uninsured transient shocks which reduce individual consumption below a 
threshold needed to retain productivity can give rise to “dynamic poverty traps” and lead to 
chronic poverty.  This can happen when families are forced to sell productive assets used to 
support their agricultural or micro-enterprises.
74  Third, uninsured risk also reduces 
efficiency through costly production and portfolio choices, such as the use of outdated but 
less risky production technologies, or holding livestock as a form of precautionary savings. 
Fourth, uninsured risk can adversely affect human capital accumulation, for example, when 
children are forced to drop out of school in the wake of an income shock in the household. 
                                                 
72 See for example, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). 
73 The results for Tanzania are drawn from a comparison of households with limited liquid asset (livestock) 
compared with wealthier ones.  The former tend to grow proportionally more sweet potatoes, a low return, low 
risk crop than the latter (see Dercon 1996).  The evidence from India is based on data on the portfolio of 
activities and investment in the Indian ICRISAT villages; reducing rainfall timing variability (via some 
mechanism of insurance) is estimated to have a large effect on farm profits of the poor households (Rosenzweig 
and Binswanger, 1993).  




Finally, unemployment benefits may provide necessary resources to increase the 
effectiveness of the job search, or to enter self-employment.
75 
  Providing income support and help in finding a new job may not only be beneficial 
for the workers themselves—it may also promote economic efficiency insofar as it enables 
better matches between workers’ abilities and the requirements of new jobs.  In many low 
and middle income countries, inadequate or non-existent social insurance mechanisms imply 
that dismissed workers cannot afford to remain without income and are forced to accept the 
first job that comes their way, even if it is not good or productive (Figure 15).   
Figure 15: Developing countries, particularly low-income ones, offer a much 
weaker and less diverse protection against unemployment risk than developed countries 
 
 
 Source: Vodopivec (2004).   
Note: Based on the presence of the following programs: Unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance, 
unemployment insurance savings accounts, severance pay, and public works.    
                                                 
75 According to Klasen and Woolard (2001), the absence of unemployment benefits in South Africa affects 
household formation and residential choices in ways that are detrimental to job finding.  The system forces the 
unemployed to base their location decisions on the availability of economic support – generally available in rural 
areas, often in parental households – rather than on the availability of job openings.  Klasen and Woolard thus 
conclude that the absence of unemployment benefits may not only lower welfare of the unemployed and their 





















































  Improving policy performance in this area requires progress toward three 
interrelated objectives. 
•  Helping workers cope with large restructurings  
•  Reinforcing insurance mechanisms that help workers cope with the income losses of 
job dislocation and promote their entrepreneurial capacity. 
•  Reaching out to the large share of workers in rural and the informal sectors who 
generally cope with risks after they have occurred, often resorting to unproductive 
strategies. 
Helping workers cope with large-scale restructurings  
 Mass layoffs occur often during public sector reforms, when large state-owned 
enterprises go through a downsizing of their workforce.  There are, however, other 
circumstances that force large firms to significantly reduce their workforce.  In the 
infrastructure sector, many vertically integrated power companies have been restructured into 
separate companies for generation, supply and distribution.  Likewise, former monopolistic 
utility providers have been exposed to increased competition or challenged by new 
regulations, and have restructured their production to respond to these pressures.  New 
technologies also lead to job losses in traditional enterprises. For example, containerization in 
ocean shipping has reduced the handling time of shipment and the need for port labor and 
ship capacity; mobile telephone companies are increasingly challenging large fixed-line 
operators; and the development of internet communications is challenging conventional post 
services.  
 There is often strong pressure to compensate groups more directly threatened by 
structural reforms, such as workers of previously protected industries who enjoyed large 
rents and job security.  Typically not poor, these groups are very vocal and could represent 
concentrated opponents to reform.  Providing significant one-time compensation to them 
may, thus, be a socially efficient strategy to push reforms ahead. 
 Workers affected by large-scale dismissals face specific difficulties.  While those 




qualifications, or with skills which are no longer demanded, face the gloomy prospect of long 
unemployment spells and inactivity.  Not only they may not find it easy to retrain and adapt 
to labor demand, but they are also likely to compete in thin labor market, especially when 
mass layoffs are concentrated in mono-cultural areas.  These problems tend to be further 
complicated by the fact that many state-owned enterprises were used to provide their workers 
with an array of social services.  For example, in transition economies, state-owned firms 
traditionally provided kindergartens and health services as well as cheap rental 
accommodation.  Social services have often been discontinued in the aftermath of the 
privatization or restructuring, but many laid off workers often maintained the subsidized 
accommodation.  This further discourages internal mobility, because workers not only face a 
very uncertain employment prospect in expanding areas, but also have to give up cheap 
renting for new accommodation at higher rental values.   
 The traditional approach to dealing with large dismissals is to promote voluntary 
departures with generous severance pay.
76  This approach tends to reduce labor’s opposition 
and to minimize the short-term social impact of restructuring or downsizing.  The challenge 
is to set severance pay at a level that will be attractive to workers yet financially sustainable.  
Too high a level can lead to high short-term costs and the adverse selection of the best 
employees leaving first.  High costs may also slow or even stop the process of firm 
restructuring.  In Ghana downsizing was halted because the government could not afford the 
severance payments.  In the 1990s Pakistan made severance payments to workers affected by 
the privatization of industrial units that included five months’ salary for each year of service 
– much higher than international norms. The agreement set a precedent for the later 
privatization of public utilities, raising the costs to unaffordable levels and delaying 
reforms.
77   
                                                 
76 It is useful to note that some shocks are transitory, i.e. the prospects of workers to find a similar job in the 
near future are perceived as high. This transitory surplus of labor can be addressed directly by firms, within the 
premise of labor regulations, through temporary layoffs, cuts in working hours with partial compensation or pay 
cuts, Winter-Ebmer (2001). The discussion in this sub-section considers cases where structural changes lead to 
permanent layoffs and often necessitate government intervention. 




 Governments can also provide specific retraining programs to help workers regain 
employment.  But these programs often operate in a context of low labor demand that makes 
it difficult to identify the training curricula and to motivate workers to participate.  In many 
cases, a low proportion of eligible workers takes up these courses, 
78 which often come too 
late, after the downsizing has taken place and workers have already left, as was the case with 
the retraining Bangladesh provided for jute workers.  In any event, for political and social 
reasons, it is likely that governments will provide such programs even if they are not highly 
effective.  To make the most of them, their design matters and needs to be adapted to the 
country’s circumstances.  Early preparation is therefore essential, and targeted intervention 
helps to minimize problems.  But where job demand is lacking, eliminating obstacles to 
private job creation through broader investment climate improvements is essential. 
Promoting entrepreneurship and efficiency 
  Measures are needed to reduce exposure of labor to external and domestic shocks or, 
if this cannot be avoided, to mitigate the income effects on displaced workers.  Sound 
macroeconomic policies and investments in education are the best risk-prevention 
instruments.  Social protection programs can mitigate the impact of risks while promoting 
labor reallocation and entrepreneurship.  Even if public resources to finance these schemes 
are limited, much can be done to promote their effectiveness by reinforcing insurance 
principles and better targeting.   
  The policy mix best suited to each country depends on the factors driving economic 
insecurity and the cost-effectiveness of the various options.
79  Three general principles 
emerge from international experience.  
 Reduce economic volatility.  Many low and middle income countries remain 
exposed to external shocks and, given their limited international links, have limited capacity 
to accommodate them.  When a negative aggregate shock hits the economy, capital—often 
the most mobile factor of production—tends to leave the country, while labor tends to bear 
                                                 
78 See Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Kikeri (1998). 
79 For more details see Holzmann and Jorgensen (2001) and World Bank (2001b). See also World Commission 




the brunt of the adjustment in terms of either real wage cuts or unemployment and 
underemployment.  Export diversification can reduce exposure to large fluctuations in 
external demand and deeper capital markets and stronger banking systems increase the ability 
to mitigate the impact.  The welfare benefits from reducing macroeconomic volatility in most 
developing countries can be substantial.
80  
 Move away from pro-cyclical fiscal policy.  The exposure of workers to external 
shocks is also compounded by the fact that their governments often lack the fiscal discipline 
to promote countercyclical financing of social programs.  Many governments tend to adopt 
an expansionary fiscal stance in good times and a contractionary stance in bad times.   
Mounting budget deficits in recessions thus creates pressures to reduce public spending on 
social protection (among other things) just when the need for it is increasing.  Greater fiscal 
discipline and a better diversification of the fiscal revenue base are also essential elements to 
guarantee that resources are available to cushion the required labor adjustment process.   
  Remove market inefficiencies.  Beyond macroeconomic policies, the most effective 
strategy for risk prevention and mitigation is to develop a sound investment climate where 
firms have incentives to invest and expand.  Investment climate improvements allow for 
stronger job creation in the formal sector and greater resources available for social programs.  
They also provide greater opportunities for workers to insure themselves against job losses 
and promote their entrepreneurial potential. 
Promoting workers’ adaptability and mobility 
 Beyond the much needed improvements in the coverage and quality of formal 
education, governments can improve the ability and willingness of workers to move to more 
productive and rewarding jobs by supporting training, counseling, and placement services.  
The effectiveness of these programs has been challenged especially in countries with limited 
capacity, but when properly targeted they can be a complementary strategy to skill 
enhancements and income support.   
                                                 
80 Estimates suggest that had Latin America and the Caribbean been able to diversify their idiosyncratic 
aggregate volatility in the 1990s they would have enjoyed a 7 per cent higher consumption, a figure that is six 




 Job search assistance is aimed at promoting transparency and information in the 
labor market so as to facilitate job matching.  In this respect, it offers a service to both 
employers who have otherwise to go through a lengthy and costly selection process and 
workers who may lack the information on suitable jobs in the market.  To be effective, this 
program requires close links between employers, the intermediation office – generally public 
employment services and, increasingly in industrial countries, private agencies – and the job 
seekers.  Taking advantage of a network of labor offices, the Czech Republic’s job brokerage 
program has been successful at reducing unemployment duration.
81 By contrast, in Brazil, 
where the network of employment services is less developed, most unemployed use personal 
channels to find a new job and often move to the informal sector while waiting for a better 
option in the formal economy.
82  In Uruguay, these schemes seem to be more useful for 
highly educated workers who have access to formal jobs than for low-skilled workers.
83 
  Labor market training includes publicly supported programs, usually through either 
direct provision (in public training institutes) or financial support (funding training costs 
and/or subsidizing trainees).
84  In many countries, governments are moving away from the role 
of direct provision of training and focusing more on addressing market failures in information 
and financing, while leaving more of the delivery to private providers.  Relying on a network 
of employment services that circulate information on skill needs training programs in 
Bulgaria, Poland, and the Slovak Republic increased the probability of leaving 
unemployment.  In Mexico the Job Training Program for Unemployed Workers 
(PROBECAT) combines short-term training for unemployed and displaced workers with 
income support (at the minimum wage) and, more importantly, placement services from the 
local employment offices.  Interestingly, on-the-job training is found to be more effective 
than classroom training, and private training centers seem to outperform government-run 
centers.
85 
                                                 
81 Terrell and Sorm (1999). 
82 Woltermann (2002). 
83 Fawcett (2001). 
84 Middleton, Ziderman, and Adams (1993). 




 Training programs for youths, even when well targeted, tend to have a poor track 
record. Interventions typically include some combination of on-the-job training, vocational 
(classroom) training, job readiness training, and/or internships. However, earlier 
interventions at the schooling stage are likely to be more effective than trying to remedy 
education failures.
86  The experience of some Latin American countries offers some 
interesting insights. The “Jovenes” programs in Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay are 
targeted at disadvantaged youth—combining training and work experience with other 
services including psychological development, and vocational assessment.  While effective in 
promoting employability of the targeted youths, the programs tend to be costly. The 
evaluation in Argentina estimated that at least nine years of higher earnings due to the 
program would be required to show a positive net present value for the groups with 
statistically significant results.
87 
Reinforcing social insurance 
 Beyond improving the welfare of the unemployed, effective social insurance 
programs improve the investment climate by facilitating the allocation of resources to more 
productive uses and encouraging entrepreneurship.  First, social insurance schemes can 
stimulate riskier but more productive jobs and industries.
88  It is estimated that lack of access 
to insurance amongst poor rural households pushes them to take up low-risk activities with 
lower returns, reducing their income potential by 25 percent in rural Tanzania and by 50 
percent in a sample of rural villages in India.
89   
 Second, uninsured transient shocks that reduce individual consumption below a 
threshold needed to retain productivity can give rise to “dynamic poverty traps”.  This 
happens when families are forced to sell productive assets needed to support their 
                                                 
86 Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar (2003). 
87 Aedo and Núñez (2001). 
88 Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) suggest that moderate levels of unemployment benefits help improving job 
matches with positive effects on productivity and output growth. 
89 The results for Tanzania are drawn from a comparison of households with limited liquid asset (livestock) 
compared with wealthier ones.  The former tend to grow proportionally more sweet potatoes, a low return and 
low risk crop than the latter, see Dercon (1996).  The evidence from India is based on data on the portfolio of 
activities and investment in the Indian ICRISAT villages; reducing rainfall timing variability (via some 
mechanism of insurance) is estimated to have a large effect on farm profits of the poor households, Rosenzweig 





90  Third, uninsured risk also reduces efficiency through 
costly production and portfolio choices, such as the use of outdated but less risky production 
technologies, or holding livestock as a form of precautionary savings.  Fourth, 
unemployment benefits may provide necessary resources to increase the effectiveness of the 
job search or to enter self-employment.
91 
  Reinforcing self-insurance among formal workers.  In most low and middle income 
countries, mandatory severance pay provisions are the prevalent form of insurance against 
unemployment for workers in the formal sector.  Generally easy to administer, the provisions 
exchange resources, in the event of unemployment, for an “insurance premium.”  As 
discussed earlier, whether the premium translates into lower wages affects labor costs for 
firms and their incentive for hiring.  But the schemes do offer a limited pooling of 
unemployment risk because they are firm-specific and because the premium generally 
evolves with tenure and not with the risk of unemployment.
92 
  Severance pay provisions suffer from noncompliance in many countries, increasing 
workers’ resistance to leaving a job.  Payments tend to increase when financial resources are 
lacking because the firm is experiencing difficulties, and they may simply not be available if 
the firm goes bankrupt.  Noncompliance also creates a burden on labor courts and 
government budgets. For example, in Slovenia unpaid claims amount to more than one-third 
of total severance pay provisions.  In Peru, not only are poor workers less likely to be entitled 
to severance pay, but they are less likely to receive it in case of dismissal.
93  I n  t h e s e  
circumstances, employment adjustments for economic reasons are impaired and workers are 
                                                 
90 See, e.g. Ravallion (2003) and World Bank ( 2002b). 
91 According to Klasen and Woolard (2001), the absence of unemployment benefits in South Africa affects 
household formation and residential choices in ways that are detrimental to job finding.  The system forces the 
unemployed to base their location decisions on the availability of economic support – generally available in 
rural areas, often in parental households – rather than on the availability of job openings.  They conclude that 
the absence of unemployment benefits may not only lower welfare of the unemployed and their dependents, but 
it may also not reduce unemployment duration – and may actually increase it.  
92 de Ferranti and others (2000) argue that, when Latin American countries had little exposure to foreign 
competition, the effective pooling of unemployment risk offered by severance pays was spread over a greater 
population, as consumers often times subsidize potentially bankrupt firms through higher prices.  However, this 
possibility has declined rapidly as countries have embarked on trade liberalization and reforms aimed at 
fostering domestic competition.  
93 See Vodopivec (2004) for Slovenia and MacIsaac and Rama (2001) for Peru. See Gill et al. (2002b) for a 




deterred from seeking better job matches.  It looms particularly large among small firms and 
among low-skilled workers who have few alternative instruments to smooth consumption.  
To tackle these shortcomings, some countries have introduced pre-funding or reduced the 
generosity of payments to bring them more in line with international experience.  Colombia 
moved toward a funded system under individual savings accounts in 1990 and Chile 
introduced a social-insurance component to its system in 2002 (see Box 6). 
Box 6:  Reforms of the severance pay: reducing labor market distortions and enhancing 
insurance 
In 1990 Colombia introduced a system of fully-funded severance pay savings accounts which 
required employers to deposit a percentage of wages into guaranteed individual accounts available to 
workers in the event of job separation (limited access to funds while employed was also foreseen). 
The reform reduced labor market distortions and promoted job creation.  Employers shifted most of 
the severance payments’ costs onto wages, but total compensation of workers (wages plus deposits to 
their savings accounts) increased.  In addition, because the reform removed the discretionary nature 
of severance payments, both separations and accessions increased.   
By transforming uncertain and conditional payments to unconditional payments monitored by the 
third party (the government), the reform also enhanced insurance function of the severance pay.   
Before the reform, non-performance of the severance pay was a big problem (for example, firms 
about to go bankrupt could simply not pay severance or could negotiate a package substantially below 
what was owed in severance payments).  Thanks to the pre-funding requirement, the reform increased 
the likelihood that the legal entitlement to severance pay is actually carried out. The new severance 
pay savings accounts strongly reduced in-kind and monetary transfers from relatives, as well as 
government-mandated transfers, received by severance payments beneficiaries.   
In 2002 Chile introduced a new, innovative unemployment insurance system which combines social 
insurance with self-insurance. Employers and employees both contribute to individual savings 
accounts but an additional contribution from employers and a small public subsidy are allocated to a 
Solidarity Fund.  The new program is effectively a funded system, with funds on individual accounts 
being managed by a freestanding administrator selected through a competitive tender. 
To stimulate reemployment, benefit recipients first draw resources from their own accounts, and upon 
depletion from the solidarity account. Withdrawals from individual accounts are triggered by 
separation from the employer, regardless of the reason. Withdrawals from the common fund are 
triggered by insufficient resources on individual accounts, if the claimant satisfies the usual 
conditions of continuing eligibility under unemployment insurance (such as not working and being 
available and searching for job), but are limited to 2 withdrawals per 5 years. Benefits are linked to 
past earnings, with a declining schedule. Moreover, workers can move any unused savings from their 
individual accounts to their old-age pension accounts on retirement.   





Increasing the pooling of risks across workers.  Evidence from industrial countries 
suggests that unemployment insurance benefits are the next natural step to pool 
unemployment risks and promote labor reallocation.
94  Most transition countries, following 
this model, have had unemployment insurance schemes since the early 1990s.  The schemes 
have been the main source of income for workers affected by labor reallocation during the 
transition. For instance, more than two-third of the households with at least one unemployed 
worker received such benefits in Hungary and Poland in the mid-1990s (see Vodopivec, 
Wörgötter, and Raju, 2003). The clear welfare gains for workers affected by job loss have to 
be weighed against the costs of these schemes and their impact on economic efficiency.  Both 
depend largely on the ability to monitor eligibility requirements to minimize moral hazard 
and make sure that workers have incentives to actively search for a new job.
95  But effective 
enforcement is difficult in developing countries, which generally have weak public 
employment services or none, compounded by a large informal economy that offers many 
opportunities for undeclared paid work.  The capacity to monitor continuing eligibility has 
been lacking in Argentina, for example, making unemployment benefits a mere cash transfer 
program.     
  Even if countries have the required administrative capacity, unemployment benefits 
should provide only a fraction of the previous wage—and they should be short-lived, to 
provide incentives for beneficiaries to seek a new job.  Poland introduced a generous and 
open-ended unemployment insurance schemes in the early 1990s, offered to all job seekers 
irrespective of whether they had lost their job or not.  Not surprisingly, the number of 
claimants soared, making the system financially unviable and contributing to the buildup of a 
large pool of long-term unemployed.  The scheme was subsequently reformed on several 
occasions to reduce disincentive effects, and now provides a low flat benefit for a limited 
duration.  The Czech Republic, by contrast, opted for less generous short-lived benefits (only 
six months) and, partly because of this, had comparatively lower unemployment in the early 
phases of the transition. 
                                                 
94 Gruber (1997) finds that in the absence of unemployment insurance, average consumption expenditures 
would fall by 22 percent. 
95 See Martin and Grubb (2001) for a review of the experience of unemployment insurance schemes in 




Combining income support for the poor with improvements in local investment conditions 
  Most of the programs discussed in this section fail to reach rural workers and those 
in the informal economy.  Traditionally, these workers have relied on private transfers to 
cope with shocks.  Informal commitments by employers to provide a minimum form of 
insurance to workers have historically been an important part of socially acceptable codes of 
conduct, especially in rural areas.
96  As part of these commitments, employers often agree to 
pay workers a fixed wage while they remain employed, regardless of the seasonal or other 
fluctuations in demand.  Moreover, it is not infrequent that employers provide loans to 
workers who face unexpected expenses.  Given the informality of the employment contract, 
these commitments give employers a lot of discretion.  Households also rely on their own 
savings and private transfers to cope with shocks.  Evidence from Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Russia suggests that private transfers account for between 2 and 41 percent of income for 
net receivers and between 1 and 8 percent of income for net givers.
97 A study in Kyrgyzstan 
found that private transfers are provided to just 12 percent of the households but account for 
more than one-third of the incomes of the households who receive them.
98   
 These forms of private risk-coping mechanisms are becoming less effective in 
sheltering poor and informal workers from risks.  Market economies require significant 
movements of labor, including in the informal or rural sector, which potentially weakens 
long-term relationships between employers and employees and makes voluntary risk-sharing 
and informal insurance commitments less effective.  In some countries, shocks have also 
become more severe, often more recurrent and difficult to anticipate, especially for those 
with low skills and experience—all reducing the potential for private transfers. For example 
informal transfers are estimated to offer little protection during shocks or periods of covariate 
risk: they are estimated to account for less than 10 per cent of the size of typical income 
shocks in bad periods in India; and in the Sahel region, following the 1984 drought, transfers 
comprised less than 3 percent of the losses of the poorest household (Morduch, 1999). 
                                                 
96 See World Bank (1995) – WDR. 
97 See Tabor (2002).  
98 See Cox et al. (1994).  The authors estimate that that poverty incidence would be 25 percent higher among 




 Under these circumstances, substituting a public “safety net” for a private coping 
system can help individuals and their families cope with severe income losses and encourage 
their entrepreneurial drive.  It can also break a vicious circle in which the household, to 
accommodate a temporary income loss, takes actions that undermine its future ability to cope 
with shock, such as taking children out of school or cutting health expenditures. For example, 
the financial crisis of the second half of the 1990s in the Philippines and in Indonesia 
triggered the entry of secondary income-earners into the labor markets – particularly of 
youths, resulting in significant declines in high school enrollment rates. 
 Three forms of “conditional” income support have been used in developing 
countries to provide a public safety net to poor people and to help improve the local 
investment conditions:  workfare programs, social investment funds, and conditional cash 
transfers.    
Workfare programs to combine income support with improvement in local conditions for 
investment.   
 Workfare programs have traditionally been the most widely used form of 
intervention to support poor households and promote local infrastructure development (for 
example in Bangladesh, India, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Tanzania, and 
Ghana).  In many South Asia countries, workfare programs started as “food-for-work” 
programs in which workers were paid for their labor with food aid from Western countries.  
They have gradually moved to “cash-for-work” operated by a variety of agencies, including 
local and state governments and NGOs, and they are increasingly viewed as insurance—not 
emergency—programs for informal and rural workers.  They generally transfer income to 
poor households, by providing unskilled manual workers with short-term employment on 
projects such as road construction and maintenance, irrigation infrastructure, reforestation, 
and soil conservation.   
 In most developing countries, workfare programs have been used to smooth 
consumption and keep poor people in contact with the labor market.
99  Well-designed 




public spending on income transfers and on development.  The Maharashtra Employment 
Guarantee Scheme in India, in operation for more than three decades, has created 
considerable irrigation, infrastructure, and rural roads in the state of Maharashtra.
100  
Workfare programs have also helped many small private contractors to emerge and grow.   
 A key aspect of workfare programs is the ability of participants to self-select.  In 
Chile and in Argentina (Trabajar), the program’s wage rate was kept well below the 
minimum wage, encouraging the poor to self-select into the program.  In the Philippines the 
program’s wage was much higher than the agricultural market wage, and a substantial 
number of nonpoor were attracted into the program.  Kenya, Malawi, Mali, and Senegal also 
paid wages above the market wage rates, undermining the self-targeting design and rationing 
jobs away from the very poor.
101  Self-selection of participants should be accompanied by 
targeting to the poorest areas to ensure that programs also promote local development.  In 
South Africa a demand-driven approach in the allocation of funds for workfare programs has 
favored more developed and better connected communities at the expense of some of the 
neediest communities.
102 
Social funds to improve the investment climate in poor areas  
  Social funds, introduced in Bolivia in the late 1980s, have become one of the main 
tools of community-led poverty reduction.  They finance small projects in poor communities. 
While the focus of early programs was on providing temporary work opportunities while also 
financing better access to basic services, recent programs have given greater emphasis on 
service delivering and connecting communities—which generally identify and partly finance 
projects—with local governments.  Social funds now absorb close to $10 billion in foreign 
and domestic financing in developing and transition countries. 
                                                                                                                                                       
99 See Ravallion (2003) for a survey; Ravallion and Datt (1995); Subbarao (1997); Teklu and Asefa (1999); 
Jalan and Ravallion (2003); Chirwa, Zgovu, and Mvula (2002).  
100 See Gaiha (2000). 
101 See Subbarao, Ahmed, and Teklu (1995) for the Philippines and World Bank ( 2002b) for the African 
countries.  
102 Haddad and Adato (2001) suggest little relationship between the district level share of public works activity 
and the district level share of poverty, unemployment and infrastructure need in a sample of 100 public works 




 A recent review of social funds in Armenia, Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, 
and Zambia offers a fairly positive assessment of their effectiveness in providing income 
support and promoting local development.
103  Evidence suggests that spending through social 
funds was highly progressive, with poor districts and poor households receiving more per 
capita support than wealthier districts or households.
104  Schools and health centers that 
received social investment funds have enjoyed equal or stronger access to staff and inputs 
and greater participation by local communities compared with other institutions.  The effects 
on poor households can also be sizable.  School infrastructure investment is estimated to 
have increased primary enrollment rates, especially in Armenia, Nicaragua, and Zambia. 
Likewise, in Bolivia social fund investments in health centers cut infant mortality rates in 
half. Finally, by involving community members in implementing and supervising projects, 
social funds may lead to cost-effective investment.  In particular, the case studies reveal that 
where social funds allowed greater community control over decisions and resources, unit 
costs were lower (by 25 to 40 percent) and community co-financing was higher than in other 
programs. Where social funds worked through private contractors and government 
intermediaries, unit costs tended to be higher. 
Conditional cash transfers to preserve human capital and health  
  Conditional cash transfers are another policy tool to combine income support with 
local development.  They belong to a family of transfer programs that combine close 
targeting with capital accumulation by making income support conditional on either basic 
needs triggers, such as utility offset payments (in some transition economies), or behavioral 
changes, such as the continued school enrollment of children or attendance at health clinics.  
They typically address chronic poverty rather than idiosyncratic risks associated with job 
loss. Their focus on human capital formation makes them suitable to address poverty and 
local development at the same time.  In Mexico (Progresa, which reached 2.3 million 
families in 1999), Brazil (Bolsa Escola and PETI) and Jamaica (PATH), conditional cash 
transfers are largely used to promote health and human capital of children.  In some 
                                                 




countries, these transfers are a quick response to economic crisis (Colombia) or a natural 
disaster (the earthquake in Turkey).  In others, they meet long-term human development 
goals.  For example, in Nicaragua, they were used to boost school enrollments. 
 Evaluations show that these programs can raise school enrollment and attendance 
rates and improve child health and nutrition.
105  The Mexican program (Progresa) increased 
primary school attendance by more than 2 percent and secondary enrollment by more than 8 
percent, while increasing health visits by some 20 percent. The Brazilian bolsa escola 
reduced school dropouts from 5.6 percent to 0.4 percent.
106  The programs also tend to be 
better targeted than general subsidies by the use of proxy means testing and geographical 
targeting.  They are highly transparent about who receives the transfers, and the level of 
benefits and the number of beneficiaries is easily adjusted in times of crisis.  As with any 
transfer program, conditional cash transfers have problems, especially when the increased 
demand for services is not met by increased supply (schools or clinics) or when the targeting 
is not sufficiently resistant to outside influence. 
4.  Concluding remarks 
 Over the past two decades, the labor markets of most developing and emerging 
economies have been exposed to growing pressures to modernize and increase their 
adaptability.  Available evidence suggests a significant degree of flexibility in most labor 
markets; with large numbers of jobs being created and destroyed every year and large real 
wage flexibility.  But this flexibility cannot be fully associated to an efficient reallocation of 
labor to its most effective uses nor to a proper rewarding of workers.  Workers flows often 
entail movements to the informal sector or to unemployment; and the observed real wage 
flexibility is often the result of an inadequate indexation of nominal wages to price hikes 
rather than appropriate wage negotiations, or to large wage losses by those changing job.       
                                                                                                                                                       
104 The percentage of beneficiaries beneath the national poverty line ranged from 71 percent in Zambia to 55 
percent in Nicaragua.  In the latter country, however, social fund spending on health and education was more 
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105 See Rawlings and Rubio (2002). 
106 See Sedlacek, Ilahi, and Gustafsson-Wright (2000).  Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2002) also estimate a 
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 Better labor market outcomes depend on a complex set of factors that shape the 
investment climate in each country and promote sustainable growth and job creation in the 
formal sector.  But labor market policy and institutions can play a role in promoting such a 
climate.  Despite some improvements in the past decade, policy interventions in the labor 
market have often failed to promote an efficient allocation of resources, income and risks in 
the labor market.  While many low- and middle-income countries have made significant 
progress in setting rules governing working conditions and the employer-worker 
relationships, the level of protection prescribed by law in many of these countries are often 
similar --  and in some instances even higher  --  than the protection mandated in industrial 
countries.  Overly ambitious labor regulations contribute to reduce the reallocation of labor 
towards productive jobs in the formal sector as they raise labor costs and curb incentives for 
firms to expand and hire more workers or to adopt new technologies.  Other firms opt out and 
remain uncovered to maintain profitability, facing great uncertainty in their labor relations 
and constraints in their growth and job creation potentials.  Improving the institutional fit of 
labor regulations with the economic reality of the different countries – and in line with the 
international experience – is one of the main challenges of labor reforms in developing and 
transition countries.  
 Reforms  of  labor  regulations will face large resistance and may not succeed if they 
are not accompanied by improvements in social protection mechanisms that cushion 
adjustment costs for workers.  In many developing countries, this task is currently hampered 
by a narrow tax base and a tendency for pro-cyclical fiscal spending which limits resources 
when they are most needed.  Most social protection schemes only cover formal sector 
workers -- that is to say the non-poor -- and do not offer adequate protection against job 
losses even amongst those with a formal job.  Rural and informal workers are often under the 
threat of unexpected illness, job loss, or poverty in old age. There are clear opportunities for 
improving the insurance component in income support schemes for formal workers and the 
pooling of risks across individuals.  And innovative programs can also reach out to poor and 
informal workers who cannot be covered by broader insurance schemes. For example, in a 
number of countries, some new forms of income support and job creation have tried to 




workfare programs.  These programs only cover a minority of the poor, and tend to be 
exposed to budgetary cuts during downturns or economic crisis.  While greater resources and 
better targeting of social protection interventions towards the neediest people are warranted 
to promote labor market adaptability, a better prospect for the poor requires a comprehensive 
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Summary Findings
To what extent have macro and structural reforms in many developing
countries affected the labor market? Are current policy settings in the
labor market adequate to cope with the current challenges of a more
dynamic but also more risky economic environment? Are there
examples of successful labor reforms that have combined greater
adaptability with greater workers’ protection? What can labor policy
do when resources are scarce and informality looms large? These are
some of the questions we address in this paper by presenting an in
depth review of formal policy and institutional settings in the labor
market of many developing and emerging economies. We also report
some evidence of the effects of policy reforms on job creation and on
the ability of workers to cope with shocks.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT NETWORK